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Silicon Valley was built on the ability of individuals to use their knowledge and 
expertise to seek better employment opportunities, an idea recognized by both 
California law and public policy. . . . We respect trade secrets, and will defend 
ourselves against these claims.1 
 
[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person . . . . The Labour of his Body, and 
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.2   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The skills, relationships, and knowledge bound up in a firm’s employees have long been 
recognized as a source of important competitive advantage.3  Yet as companies increasingly rely 
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1 Charlotte Raab, Rivals Likely to Reach for Google's "Wallet", AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (May 29, 2011), available 
at 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ikV2_xjlO6v1DSh8G0hR6Ifxe1PQ?docId=CNG.39e901d3
8db6686358703e5e1cbc25ce.11 (last viewed Oct. 7, 2011) (quoting a Google spokesman commenting on a trade 
secret misappropriation lawsuit brought by eBay). The case alleges that a former executive of eBay’s PayPal 
division, who had been negotiating a failed mobile payments deal between the two companies, was later hired by 
Google to work on the same issues using eBay’s trade secrets and violating various other duties to eBay and 
contracts in the process. 
2 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18 (Richard Cox ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc.1982) (1690). 
3 See, e.g., Sharon F. Matusik & Charles W.L. Hill, The Utilization of Contingent Work, Knowledge Creation, and 
Competitive Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 680 (1998) (discussing the relationship between flexible employer-
employee relationships and the accumulation of knowledge for use in securing competitive advantage). 
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on the strength of their human capital—in other words, their employees—for generating revenue, 
the potential economic harm inflicted by departing employees who move to a competitor is 
increasingly severe.  As a result, firms are keen to use all available legal tools to restrict the post-
employment mobility of their valuable employees, even as public policy may be shifting toward 
prioritizing employee mobility.4  This tension in the modern workplace also has business ethics 
implications as employers, employees, and competitors navigate these conflicting economic 
incentives and policy goals. 
This tension between an employee’s mobility and the interests of the employer is not a 
new development.  Notably, the most used and discussed posttermination employee restrictive 
covenant is the covenant not to compete.  These agreements have been contentious in the 
common law for centuries, with the earliest reported English cases dating back to the 15th 
century.5  Even in the early cases, the courts developed a rule of reason to evaluate these 
restrictions and “balanc[e] the social utility of certain types of restraints against their possible 
undesirable effects upon the covenantor and the public. . . .”6  The reasonableness test these  
early courts applied to covenants not to compete is still basically the same today and has received 
a great deal of attention by scholars, but there are two more recently developed, less understood 
employee-mobility restrictions that we also examine in this article, the doctrine of inevitable 
disclosure and garden leave.  To begin to address this research gap we take both a legal analysis 
and an applied ethics approach to evaluate, first, covenants not to compete, and then inevitable 
disclosure and garden leave.  This allows us to take an in-depth, comparative look at these 
restrictions and to highlight the associated problems and benefits of each in order, ultimately, to 
make recommendations on whether the newer concepts provide desirable alternatives to 
covenants not to compete.  In general, we find that inevitable disclosure is highly problematic; 
however, garden leave, while not a perfect solution, has the potential compared to the other 
options to be a useful tool for managers as they seek to pursue business goals related to 
employee mobility and to do so in an ethically sound manner. 
The continued importance of this human capital management reality and how new 
restrictions are entering the debate over employee freedom of job mobility are emphasized by 
recent news reports about Bank of America, simultaneously the United States’ largest lender and 
deposit holder.  The financial press reported that, in an apparent response to the loss of “a 
financial adviser with $5.9 billion in client assets to a rival,” some high value employees of the 
bank’s U.S. Trust unit received notice that they would be subject to a new term of employment.7  
In advance of their usual bonus payments, the remaining U.S. Trust financial advisers were told 
they must sign a new “garden leave” provision to keep their jobs.8  The additional contract 
                                                 
4 See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent 
Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 164 (2008) (finding that “recent developments 
signal a shift to a strict approach to [evaluating] restrictive covenants founded on a dominant policy concern for 
protection of employee mobility”). 
5 Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 631 (1960) (discussing the 
significance of the early English cases, including the Dyer’s Case in 1414). 
6 Id. at 630 (describing the opinion in Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.)). 
7 Hugh Son, BofA Forces ‘Garden Leave’ on Brokers After Defection, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 18, 2011, 
1:29 PM EST), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-02-18/bofa-forces-garden-leave-on-brokers-after-
defection.html. 
8 Id. 
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clauses changed the previous terms such that “[a]dvisers who previously could leave after two 
weeks notice now must remain for 60 days and are forbidden from soliciting clients for a total of 
eight months. . . .”9  One observer, the president of an executive search firm, assessed the 
employer’s actions this way:  “They’re sending the message, ‘Make no mistake, you will incur 
our wrath, this is not a place you want to leave.’”10  She then cautioned that “[i]t’s very rare that 
a company would have garden-leave provisions for producers, and I think this could backfire if 
people view it as draconian.”11  The efforts were reportedly taken by the wealth management unit 
“to stem defections as rivals jockey to manage money for high-net-worth individuals.”12 When 
the financial stakes are high the lines of conflict between the interests of employers and their 
valuable employees become clearly defined. 
In contrast to an employer’s fears of employee mobility that may transfer valuable 
knowledge to competitors, the ease of changing jobs in the United States can be an important 
way for an individual to advance her career and increase her earnings.13 In difficult economic 
times, however, a prospective employee’s leverage to negotiate the terms of employment may be 
diminished, while an employer’s negotiation position is correspondingly strengthened.14  Though 
both parties are likely concerned with terms of employment that are usually negotiated, such as 
salary and benefits, restrictions on the employee’s post-employment career mobility remain an 
underappreciated issue.  In exchange for even an entry-level job, an enthusiastic and eager-to-
please new employee may casually agree to a restrictive covenant that will have significant, 
unforeseen, and potentially damaging career consequences in the future.   
When it comes to restrictions on an employee’s post-employment freedom to take any 
new job she may choose, employers’ and employees’ interests are often in sharp conflict.  In 
these common instances the courts, sometimes with assistance from legislatures, must balance 
concerns of fairness, choice of vocation, freedom of contract, economic efficiency, the public 
interest, knowledge transfer, and business realities.  While courts routinely adjudicate these 
disputes over employee mobility, they seldom, if ever, discuss the ethical justifications for 
choosing one outcome over another.  There are obviously tradeoffs inherent in any contract 
between an employer and an employee in which the parties bargain over the work required and 
the compensation provided for that work.  Yet, does the law adequately protect employee 
freedoms while allowing an employer to protect its hard-earned competitive advantage?  Does 
the law favor one party over another in this instance?  What is best from a societal standpoint?  
Should the law favor one of the parties? If so, what are the underlying principles to support that 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id. (quoting Mindy Diamond, president of Diamond Consultants LLC). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See Catherine Rampell, Many with New College Degree Find the Job Market Humbling, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
2011, at A1 (discussing the current difficult job market for college graduates and the importance of moving into a 
better job). One economist observed, “If you don’t move within five years of graduating, for some reason you get 
stuck where you are. That’s just an empirical finding.” Id. (quoting Till von Wachter, an economist at Columbia 
University).  
14 See. e.g., Kate O’Neill, Should I Stay or Should I Go?—Covenants Not to Compete in a Down Economy: A 
Proposal for Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 83 (2010) (advocating for courts 
to limit noncompete enforcement to employees with significant bargaining power to negotiate the agreement at the 
outset of the employment relationship). 
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potential imbalance?  Moreover, what are the ethical implications of an employer’s decision to 
restrict the future employment choices of an employee?  Also, which of the available options and 
justifications for restricting an employee’s freedom of professional movement have the most 
ethical and practical grounding—and why?  
While these questions persist, to date there has been little guidance for courts and policy 
makers on what ethical considerations surround post-employment legal restrictions upon 
employee mobility.  Business law and employment law scholars, who in the last decade or so 
have focused on the fast-evolving nature of the employment relationship, provide an initial, 
broad view of why these legal tools and their attendant moral implications are increasingly 
important for employers.  Some of the consistent themes inherent in this body of research are the 
importance of technology and knowledge management for business advantage, alongside a trend 
toward individualized contractual relations between employees and employers in a changing 
American employment market.  For instance, Katherine V.W. Stone has explored the “new 
psychological contract” between employers and employees, which is marked by disputes over 
human capital development and ownership as opposed to the historical model of job security and 
promotions with a single firm.15  Kenneth Dau-Schmidt has examined the role of technology16 
and labor contracting17 in the modern workplace.  Terry Morehead Dworkin and Elletta Sangrey 
Callahan have detailed the use of nondisclosure agreements and measured their effectiveness 
against other attempts to restrict information, including covenants not to compete.18  Joan T.A. 
Gabel and Nancy R. Mansfield have looked at the legal implications of the “cyberspace 
workplace” where workers often work remotely through the use of new technologies.19  Michael 
Garrison and John Wendt also have specifically explored the policy implications and emerging 
trends in restrictions on employee mobility.20 
Among the assumptions that underlie the current approach to this evolving workplace are 
that employees are mobile and that the old paradigm of long-term and even lifetime employment 
with one employer are now things of the past.21  A fast-moving and competitive labor 
marketplace has replaced the old employer-employee arrangement.  This new dynamic has been 
called a “high-velocity labor market,” particularly in the high-tech sector.22  In this context of 
rapid job hopping there also has been criticism of legal rules that impede the ease of mobility and 
                                                 
15 Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications for the Changing Workplace for Labor and 
Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001). 
16 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology: Implications for Labor and 
Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2001). 
17 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of 
Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 313-14 (2003). 
18 Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 169-71 (1998). 
19 Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and Its Impact on the Employment 
Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 323 (2003) (providing a detailed 
view of the legal implications for employment relationships in a technology-driven work environment). 
20 Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4. 
21 See, e.g. Stone, supra note 15, at 539-41. 
22 ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR 
MARKET (2003). 
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the speed of this labor market.23  Moreover, the impending new Restatement of Employment Law 
provides further evidence that both legal scholars and practitioners are currently debating the 
roots and underlying values of the U.S. employment laws, including legal rules that directly 
implicate employee mobility.24 
 This article seeks to add a new dimension to this debate by examining the business law 
and business ethics aspects of three modern mechanisms for restricting an employee’s post-
employment mobility either to a competitor or to the employee’s own newly formed competing 
enterprise.  The article’s structure is as follows: After the Introduction, Part I presents the 
background and discusses the motivations and incentives for employers to restrict their former 
employees’ professional mobility.  Next, Part II discusses the law and the associated public 
policy concerns of three legal mechanisms for restricting post-employment mobility:  covenants 
not to compete, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, and garden leave.  Part III provides a 
business ethics critique of these mechanisms from the rights, utilitarian, and fairness 
perspectives.  Part IV then presents recommendations for policy makers related to balancing the 
competing interests involved in restricting employee mobility, as well as suggestions for 
additional research.  
 
 
I.  BACKGROUND ON EMPLOYEE MOBILITY RESTRICTIONS 
 
Employment mobility is generally supported by public policy and favored by employees.25  
Nevertheless, employers have a valid interest in managing their current and former employees’ 
ability to be professionally mobile.  This section considers these sometimes conflicting interests, 
together with some of the overarching policy issues arising from the legal constraints on 
employee mobility.   
 In general, the economic mobility of employees ensures their personal freedom to pursue 
a livelihood of their choice, in the position where their capabilities will be most productive and 
where they are most likely to achieve success.26  Society benefits from maximized productivity, 
                                                 
23 Alan Hyde, Should Noncompetes Be Enforced?: New Empirical Evidence Reveals the Economic Harm of Non-
compete Covenants, REGULATION, Winter 2010, at 6 (adapted from a chapter in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (Michael Wachter & Cynthia Estlund eds., forthcoming 2011)). 
24 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to the Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of 
Employment Law: Putting the Restatement in Its Place, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 143, 146 (2009) (“What we 
have seen is a widely documented trend toward short term employment, the rise of contingent labor, the rollback of 
employer sponsored health plans and benefits, a reversion to external labor market practices, and, more recently, the 
most significant economic downturn since the Great Depression.” (citations omitted)); Matthew W. Finkin, Second 
Thoughts on a Restatement of Employment Law, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279 (2005) (critiquing the underlying 
assumptions of the need for a Restatement of Employment Law). 
25 See generally Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 112 (finding an “emerging trend in the law of employee 
noncompete agreements” indicating “that courts are generally more inclined to invalidate employee noncompete 
agreements than under the modern approach and that the law of employee noncompete agreements is becoming 
more protective of the employee's interest in mobility”). 
26 See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 433 (Pa. 1960) (the court aimed to “be particularly mindful of any effect 
our decision in this case might have in disrupting this pattern of employee mobility, both in view of possible 
restraints upon an individual in the pursuit of his livelihood and the harm to the public in general in forestalling to 
any extent widespread technological advances”). 
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as well as the dissemination of skills and knowledge, which can contribute to innovation.27  For 
instance, some professionals such as lawyers and (in some jurisdictions) physicians, serve a 
recognized public policy function, which has resulted in a prohibition on non-competition 
agreements for those types of workers.28   
In recent times, freedom of mobility has become increasingly more important for 
employees as the new psychological employment contract eschews notions of loyalty and 
commitment, 29thereby eliminating the security of long-term employment, pay and promotions 
based on tenure, and generous pensions for retirement.30  Instead, as employees shoulder the 
risks of economic cycles, save for their own retirements, and are paid only what globalized 
markets will bear, they must focus their efforts on developing the worth of their own human 
capital in order to ensure the marketability of their labor.31  Indeed, marketing their labor by 
switching jobs seems to have a large impact on employees’ financial success.  A recent economic 
study found that among college graduates, those making three job changes at optimal points in 
their career gained wage increases amounting to as much as thirty-two percent compared to a 
graduate making no job changes.32  Consequently, restricting employee mobility can have the 
effect of depressing wage levels.33  
 To place this discussion in a contemporary context, we consider the fast-paced modern 
business world in which a firm’s employees hold much of the business knowledge and 
technological skills required to successfully operate the firm.  As high technology and 
knowledge usage has become increasingly important, firms have come to rely on their employees 
(in other words, human capital) for their competitive advantage.  Firms need to manage the risk 
                                                 
27 Id.; see also supra Part III.B (discussing cost-benefit analysis). 
28 See generally Alina Klimkina, Note, Are Noncompete Contracts Between Physicians Bad Medicine? Advocating 
in the Affirmative by Drawing a Public Policy Parallel to the Legal Profession, 98 KY. L.J. 131 (2009) (discussing 
the ban in all states on noncompetes for lawyers and arguing that physician noncompetes should be similarly banned 
prohibited). 
29 See Timothy L. Fort, The First Man and the Company Man: The Common Good, Transcendence, and Mediating 
Institutions, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 391, 392 (1999) ( “Corporate downsizing has left the loyalty of employees unrequited. 
Once, an employee's loyalty and commitment to a company provided a sense of identity and meaning—employees 
were ‘company men’ . . . . [; however, i]t is increasingly difficult for individuals to find a sense of long-term identity 
in corporate America. Indeed, in light of this emphasis on self-reliance, the common good seems merely a quaint, 
nostalgic phrase for today's company man. Thus, the ‘company man’ has become the ‘first man.’”). 
30 See Stone, supra note 15, at 572 (discussing how the old employment model arose under the New Deal where 
“there evolved an employment system comprised of rising longevity-based wages, employer-based health insurance, 
and employment linked retirement security”). 
31 Id. at 570 (“It becomes clear from an examination of the writings of prominent management theorists that 
corporations are searching to find a way to make the shift away from long-term career employment not only 
acceptable, but desirable. By promising employees the opportunity to develop their human capital, the new 
psychological contract tries to do this. Employers promise employability and training so that, in return, employees 
will see themselves as entrepreneurs marketing their own human capital in a market place.”). 
32 Rusty Tchernis, Measuring Human Capital and Its Effects on Wage Growth, 24 J. ECON. SURVS. 362, 378 (2010). 
33 Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly Bind: Non-competition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm 
Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 414 (2009) (“Our results show that non-competition agreements can serve as 
an effective means for securing employee resources within the boundary of the firm. Our findings also indicate, 
however, that the human capital of the firm’s managers is changed by the presence of covenants not to compete.”). 
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of losing this advantage, particularly when those valuable employees depart to work for a 
competitor34 and even when that competitor is located halfway around the world.35   
A recent example from the technology sector drives this point home.  The Wall Street 
Journal reported how Google, Inc. unveiled its Google Wallet and Google Offers concepts in 
advance of a summer 2011 product launch.36  Like other Google ventures into the mobile device 
market with its Android operating system, these technology products go beyond the company’s 
original core search engine and advertising business model.  The so-called digital wallet “will let 
consumers with Android smartphones pay for goods and services or receive coupons and offers 
by waving the phone in front of a special reader at the checkout counter.”37   
 Another story on the same page of the business section that day reported that eBay and its 
PayPal division filed a lawsuit against Google in a matter related to the very same mobile-
payments business activities.38  Specifically, eBay claims “that Google poached two senior 
executives . . . who then recruited other employees from eBay [and that] those employees used 
PayPal trade secrets to develop Google digital commerce products.”39  The lawsuit alleges that 
one of the former executives “transferred digital documents outlining PayPal's mobile-payment 
and point-of-sales strategies just days before leaving the company for Google. EBay says those 
documents were critical to its mobile-payments strategy.”40  In leaving eBay, the executive took 
not only his personal inalienable human capital but he also allegedly misappropriated trade 
secrets and shared them with a competitor, breached his fiduciary duties, and violated an 
agreement not to solicit fellow employees.41  
 This dispute illustrates a modern-day dilemma that worker mobility raises for the 
employers, employees, competitors, and policymakers involved.  In a fast-moving business 
world where knowledge and the individuals who create and use that knowledge are key sources 
of competitive advantage, the legal mechanisms available to employers have become more 
important than ever.42  Indeed, because of their importance and their impact on individual 
freedom of mobility, the underlying normative justifications for those legal mechanisms upon 
which courts and legislatures rely are also of great importance.  To establish the motivations and 
stakes involved with issues of employee mobility, this part reviews why employers have 
significant incentives to attempt to control when their workers end the employment relationship 
and where they move afterwards. 
                                                 
34 Id. at 382. 
35 See Marisa Pagnattaro, “The Google Challenge”: Enforcement of Noncompete and Trade Secret Agreements for 
Employees Working in China, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 603 (2007) (examining, in part, the complications of managing 
employee-possessed knowledge across international borders). 
36 Roger Cheng, Google Unveils Its Digital-Walled Plan, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2011, at B3. 
37 Id. 
38 Ian Sherr & Andrew Morse, Ebay Sues Google over Mobile-Payments System, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2011, at B3.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See Complaint, PayPal, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 111CV201863 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26, 2011), 2011 WL 
2098304 (providing a detailed description of the allegations). 
42 See Constance E. Bagley, What's Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 
630-31 (2010) (using the example of the corporate lawyer’s role in anticipating the inevitable disclosure of trade 
secrets as a way to manage the legal aspects of a potential competitive advantage over rivals). 
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As a strategic matter, employers will seek a sustainable competitive advantage over their 
business rivals.43  In recent years business law scholars have recognized the important role of law 
in achieving competitive advantage in recent years.44  The broad applicability of this concept is 
demonstrated by the proliferation of scholarship in both the business law45 and management 
literatures46 that discusses the role of law in creating competitive advantage.  To the extent that 
human capital is a source of sustainable competitive advantage in its business model, a firm will 
compete in part by seeking to exclude the human capital of its employees from use by 
competitors.47  In effect, a strategic employer may want to treat the human capital (i.e., the 
employee) as a rivalrous and excludable private good.  For instance, a firm may develop a 
technological advantage in the form of a factory machine that belongs exclusively to the firm.  
Those ownership rights mean the firm can exclude others from the using the machine.  The 
technology in the machine may be patentable, in which case the firm could gain a time-limited 
monopoly to exclude others from utilizing it.  In addition, the unique and valuable technological 
knowledge and processes used to create a product may qualify as a legally protected trade secret.   
However, human beings are obviously not some sort of transferable, technological 
commodity owned by firms—despite modern employees’ key role as a repository of valuable 
intellectual property.48  An undeniable prohibition on slavery or involuntary solitude makes it 
clear that employees are free to leave a job, under at-will employment or under an employment 
contract, and cannot be forced to work.49  While employed, the individual owes a fiduciary duty 
of loyalty to the employer.50  This duty of loyalty will provide the employer with some comfort 
                                                 
43 For a leading description of sustainable competitive advantage in the management literature, see Jay Barney, Firm 
Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT. 99 (1991) (widely cited as the seminal work on the 
resource-based theory). 
44 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 42 (discussing the role of law in business strategy development); David Orozco, 
Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual Property Management Resource, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 687 (2010) (describing the 
role of legal and regulatory acumen in finding competitive advantage in a firm’s intellectual property management). 
45 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 42; Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1,10 
(2008) (identifying categories of legal strategy that can lead to competitive advantage); Orozco, supra note 44. 
46 See, e.g., GEORGE SIEDEL & HELENA HAAPIO, PROACTIVE LAW FOR MANAGERS: A HIDDEN SOURCE OF 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (2011); Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378 (2008). 
47 See, e.g., Matusik & Hill, supra note 3, at 687 (“Contingent work may disseminate valuable private knowledge 
into the external environment, leading to the decay of competencies and a loss of competitive advantage. The 
departure of individuals causes a loss to the firm routines and practices in which these individuals participated.” 
(citation omitted)). 
48 Cf. Joseph F. Phillips, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Through an Internet Lens: Is the Doctrine's Demise Truly 
Inevitable?, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 402-03 (2003) (“In terms of trade secret jurisprudence . . . the employee's 
rights are of special importance. Preventing restrictions on freedom of job choice is one of the most basic rights that 
the American laborer enjoys.” (citing U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIII, § 1 (prohibiting involuntary servitude)) (emphasis 
added)). 
49 A classic case embodying the rule against granting the equitable relief of specific performance for personal 
service contracts—but allowing an injunction against working for another employer in breach of an employment 
contract—is Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Carnera, 52 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1931), in which the court granted a 
boxing promoter an injunction against a boxer whose intent to box for another employer violated the parties’ 
exclusive services contract. 
50 See generally Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in the United States, 20 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL'Y 321 (1999) (discussing the employee duty of loyalty). See also Orly Lobel, Citizenship, 
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that an employee will not engage in activities like competition to the employer’s detriment (and 
potential legal recourse if the duty is breached).  Employers will, however, seek to use other 
legal means to diminish the ability of their workers to leave and engage in damaging 
competition. 
An initial tactic for employers is to claim ownership of a piece of knowledge in a way 
that it can be separated from the employee and, thus, restricted from use by that employee 
without the employer’s permission.51  Examples of proprietary knowledge ownership held by an 
employer would be patent rights or, perhaps less defined, rights in propriety trade secrets.  Both 
patent protection, with all of its formal requirements and federal approval, and trade secret law, 
which arises circumstantially, are separate areas of law outside of the employer-employee 
relationship.   
It also is true that knowledge is not bounded in the same way as other economically 
exploitable assets; rather, as compared to other knowledge resources, ideas are unique in that 
they lack of boundaries.52  Because business-valuable knowledge can be easily diffused and may 
lose value as it becomes dispersed, employers may try to restrict access to information such as 
trade secrets, and they may be more comfortable with doing that by contract instead of relying on 
intellectual property protections.53  In addition, employers will also make efforts to protect other 
proprietary information that may not rise to the level of a protectable trade secret, such as a client 
list.  
Using contracts to achieve competitive advantage,54 employers may utilize a variety of 
contractual tools to manage what, from their perspective, is undesirable knowledge diffusion.  
Short of directly impacting employee mobility by contract, as discussed below in the context of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433 (2009) (discussing the 
duty of loyalty in a new employment context of shorter employment periods and the employee’s relationship to the 
corporation and society). In addition, nonemployee stakeholders such as members of a corporation’s board of 
directors also will have a duty of loyalty to the entity. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Challenge 
of Company Stock Transactions for Directors’ Duties of Loyalty, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 437, 444-57 (2006) 
(discussing the duty of loyalty).  
51 See generally Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine Covenant Not 
to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing the separation of knowledge ownership rights 
between employers and employees). 
52 For instance, when describing the attributes of knowledge in a study of geographic mobility of engineers, two 
management scholars observed: 
Ideas, because they have no material content, should be the least spatially-bounded of all 
economic activities. Being weightless, their transport is limited only by the quality and availability 
of communication. Since ideas serve both as the inputs and outputs in their own production, their 
location need be constrained neither by the happenstance of the spatial distribution of raw 
materials, energy, and labor, nor by that of demand and markets. 
Paul Almeida & Bruce Kogut, Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility of Engineers in Regional Networks, 45 
MGMT. SCI. 905, 905 (1999).  
53 See Kristen Osenga, Information May Want to Be Free, but Information Products Do Not: Protecting and 
Facilitating Transactions in Information Products, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2009) (citing contract law as 
“an appealing alternative to traditional intellectual property protection” and adding that “[b]usinesses are 
comfortable and familiar with contracts, probably even more so than intellectual property”). 
54 See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 724, 765 (2010). 
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covenants not to compete and garden leave, employers may use contracts to supplement the 
default legal framework for trade secret protection in their jurisdiction.   For example, employee-
executed nondisclosure and confidentiality agreements are contractual provisions that restrict the 
transfer of information and are beyond the default rule of an employee’s duty of loyalty.55  These 
agreements seek to stop knowledge flows to competitors; however, they do not by themselves 
restrict an employee from engaging in competition or necessarily address employee mobility.  In 
addition, unlike some contractual restrictions such as covenants not to compete, 
“[c]onfidentiality agreements . . . are enforceable even in states in which anti-competition clauses 
are prohibited.”56   
This section has described employer motivations to restrict knowledge transfer to 
competitors.  The next part lays out three legal mechanisms for restricting such knowledge 
transfer: the covenant not to compete, garden leave, and the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.  
Each legal restriction raises important ethical questions because these mechanisms directly 
address an employee’s freedom of mobility after the employment relationship has ended. 
 
 
II. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR RESTRICTING EMPLOYEE MOBILITY 
 
In this part, we examine three illustrative legal mechanisms used by employers to restrict the 
post-employment mobility, and thus freedom, of their workers.  In turn, we discuss each concept 
along with the relevant legislation and case law that further explains how the mechanism is 
applied in various jurisdictions.  This descriptive discussion sets the stage for Part III, where the 
business ethics and philosophical analysis of each concept leads to conclusions about the best 
use, if any, of these legal tools. 
 
A. Noncompetes 
 
The most widely used contractual tool for restricting an employee’s post-employment mobility is 
the covenant not to compete.57  The covenant not to compete (also called a non-competition 
agreement or, simply, a noncompete) comes in two types.  First, it may create restrictions on 
post-employment competition with the employer if it is agreed to by either a former employee.  
Second, a former owner who has sold the goodwill of the business may agree not to compete 
with the new owner. Non-employment-related covenants that fall into this second category 
include restrictive covenants that are often included in franchise agreements.58  In either the post-
                                                 
55 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 18, at 169-71. 
56 Id. at 156-57 (adding that “[c]oncerns regarding restraint of trade [as with covenants not to compete] are much 
less directly implicated in this context; restrictions on access to information, rather than employee movement, are 
involved”). 
57 Quantifying the number of noncompetes in use—much less tracking the trend in noncompete usage and disputes 
over time—is difficult because most are not publicly reported. Nonetheless, scholars agree that noncompetes are 
increasingly being used in jurisdictions where they are enforceable. See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, 
Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2001) (stating that 
noncompetes “are an increasingly common feature of employment”). 
58 See, e.g., Michael R. Gray & Jason M. Murray, Covenants Not to Compete and Nonsignatories: Enjoining Unfair 
Conspiracies, 25 FRANCHISE L.J. 107, 107 (2006) (“Most franchise agreements today contain some form of 
noncompetition clause, covenant not to compete, restrictive covenant, or other agreement by the franchisee ‘not to 
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employment or sale of a business instance, the contract restricts, for a specified time and scope, 
the otherwise legally permissible activities of the individual.  For our purposes, we discuss only 
the former employee situation because of our emphasis on the ethical implications of restricting 
employee mobility; although other situations, such as with franchisees, may still implicate an 
individual’s freedom of mobility and resulting ethical issues.59 
While noncompete enforcement is, on its face, an anticompetitive tactic, courts will allow 
enforcement when the restrictions are reasonable and legitimate business interests are being 
protected.60  Moreover, by definition, the post-employment noncompete that is pertinent to this 
article is a separate contract or contract provision between an employer and an individual 
employee.  When accepting the noncompete the employee is voluntarily agreeing to restrictions 
on her otherwise lawful post-employment activities.  The terms of the noncompete, thus, go 
beyond an employee’s duty of loyalty and other fiduciary duties that apply only during the 
employment relationship but not after.   
For example, in Mohr v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp. the plaintiff-employees had 
signed a “noncompetition covenant” with their former employer and a successor entity.61  The 
agreement provided they “would not compete with the Mellon Corporation with any similar 
investment business within 50 miles of any city or town listed on a schedule to the Agreement 
from the later of five years from the date of closing [of the sale of the original entity-employer] 
or twelve months after termination . . . .”62 The agreement also included language that indicated 
the employees understood that its violation would threaten the employer’s valuable goodwill, as 
well as a provision that memorialized the parties’ sense of the covenant’s presumed 
reasonableness.63  In addition, as other cases demonstrate, standard non-competition agreements 
are often included alongside provisions addressing post-employment confidentiality, 
nonsolicitation of clients, and nonsolicitation of fellow employees, all of which prohibit post-
employment activities that, absent these contractual terms, would otherwise be permissible.64 
                                                                                                                                                             
compete with the franchise system it is entering, either during the term of the franchise agreement or for a period 
following termination of the agreement, or both.’ These noncompete agreements are one of the best means available 
to a franchisor to protect its interest in its trademarks, service marks, trade secrets, processes, and other confidential 
business information.” (endnote omitted)). For a detailed discussion of restrictions found in non-competition 
covenants in the franchise context, see generally Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against Competition, 
80 IOWA L. REV. 1049 (1995). 
59 For a discussion of the business encroachment phenomenon related to franchising and some of the implications 
for the mobility of individual entrepreneurs, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 
191 (2010); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories: A Community Standard, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 779, 
788-94 (2010). 
60 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 18, at 169-70. 
61 371 Fed. App’x 10 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion). 
62 Id. at 12. 
63 Id. at 13-14. 
64 See, e.g., Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2010). In Zambelli, a fireworks company 
had the employee-defendant sign a noncompete that included several typical restrictive covenant provisions, 
including the following: 
1. A clause prohibiting Wood from ‘engag[ing] in any manner in the pyrotechnic business’ within 
the Continental United States or taking any position of employment with any company engaged in 
the sale or production of pyrotechnic displays for a period of two years after leaving Zambelli;  
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 When looking at the legitimate interests at stake, the courts will also consider the nature 
and significance of the employee’s skills.  The New York Court of Appeals has pointed out, “[i]n 
general, we have strictly applied the rule to limit enforcement of broad restraints on competition” 
and, in specific cases, have “limited the cognizable employer interests under the first prong of 
the common-law rule to the protection against misappropriation of the employer's trade secrets or 
of confidential customer lists, or protection from competition by a former employee whose 
services are unique or extraordinary.”65  As is the case in New York, some states evaluate 
whether an employee possesses such an extraordinary skill and expertise that a strict imposition 
of post-employment restrictions is necessary to protect the employer from unfair competition.66  
However, not all jurisdictions require such expertise and knowledge on the part of the 
employee.67  
In the vast majority of jurisdictions that do enforce noncompetes, courts will use a 
reasonableness test.  A typical articulation of the reasonableness standard comes from New 
York’s high court, the New York Court of Appeals, in BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg.68  There the 
court stated the common reasonableness test as follows: 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
2. A non-solicitation provision proscribing Wood from soliciting any former customers or clients 
of Zambelli as well as any Zambelli employees for alternative employment for a period of two 
years after leaving Zambelli; 
3. A confidentiality clause preventing the disclosure or use of trade secrets or any information 
regarding the operation of Zambelli's business; 
4. A provision that Wood provide Zambelli with three months' notice of resignation; 
5. A provision permitting a court to modify the terms of the 2005 Agreement in order to render it 
enforceable in the event the non-compete provision was found to be unreasonable; 
6. A provision whereby Wood agreed to pay all legal fees, costs, and expenses if Zambelli 
prevailed in a legal proceeding to enforce the terms of the 2005 Agreement; 
7. A choice of law provision stating that Pennsylvania law would govern the interpretation of the 
2005 Agreement. 
Id. at 416. 
65 BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999) (citing Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 
N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976)). 
66 Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971) (holding that oral surgeon skills in a rural upstate New York 
community were not sufficiently unique and valuable to justify a refusal to enforce the contractual protection of 
employer); see also BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d 1220 (holding accountant’s services and skills insufficiently 
extraordinary). 
67 For instance, some noncompete cases highlight that even low-skilled employees may be subject to noncompete 
enforcement actions. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp., v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 500 
(E.D. Ky. 1996) (allowing noncompete enforcement against retail store security guards due to employer investment 
in the employees’ training). Even under California law, which bans noncompete, courts may impose geographic 
restrictions on employee mobility to enforce nonsolicitation of an employer’s clients by former employees. See Hair 
Club for Men, LLC v. Elite Solutions Hair Alternatives, Inc. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30167 (E.D. Cal. 2007) 
(granting an injunction based on a geographically defined client-nonsolicitation agreement with former employee-
hair stylists). 
68 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1222-23 (N.Y. 1999). 
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The modern, prevailing common-law standard of reasonableness for employee 
agreements not to compete applies a three-pronged test.  A restraint is reasonable 
only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the legitimate 
interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, 
and (3) is not injurious to the public.  A violation of any prong renders the 
covenant invalid.69 
 
Pursuant to one form or another of the reasonableness test, the majority of U.S. 
jurisdictions will enforce noncompetes to some extent.70  Research shows that most states have 
what can be construed as a moderate level of noncompete enforcement.71  There are, however, 
states that impose a virtual ban on noncompetes.72  Most famously, California has a strong, 
longstanding position in favor of employee freedom and against noncompetes, and the state’s 
courts have continually upheld the ban based on public policy grounds.73  However, jurisdictions 
that allow post-employment noncompete enforcement will apply some version of the 
reasonableness test coupled with an evaluation of the stakeholders’ interests.74  These states use 
                                                 
69 Id. at 1223 (citation omitted). The court went on to write: 
New York has adopted this prevailing standard of reasonableness in determining the validity of 
employee agreements not to compete. “In this context a restrictive covenant will only be subject to 
specific enforcement to the extent that it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the 
employer's legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably 
burdensome to the employee.” 
Id. (quoting Reed, Roberts Assocs., 353 N.E.2d at 593). 
70 See generally COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian Malsberger ed., 2009).  
71 See Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenant Not to Compete 
Agreements, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 753, 780 (2011) (“[T]he 
majority of states have followed a moderate course that seems to comport with traditional noncompete aesthetics of 
moderation through narrowly tailored and balanced—and reasonable—protectable interests that foster business 
investments in workers' human capital.”). 
72 The two states with near complete bans on covenants not to compete are North Dakota and California, although 
both states permit restrictions on post-employment competition related to an owner’s sale of a business. See Norman 
D. Bishara, Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility with Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment: 50 
States, Public Policy, and Covenants Not to Compete in an Information Economy, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
287, 294 n.19 (2006). 
73 A recent much-discussed California Supreme Court case on noncompetes addressed the public policy implications 
of the state’s statutory ban on noncompetes. See Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293 (Cal. 2008) 
(reiterating California’s strong public policy against enforcing contractual restraints on employment and rejecting 
calls for a “narrow restraint” exception); see also Bradford P. Anderson, Casenote: Edwards v. Arthur Andersen 
LLP: There is not a “Narrow Restraint” Exception to California’s Prohibition of Noncompetition Agreements, and 
a General Release May Not Mean What It Says, 39 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 163 (2009) (providing a detailed 
discussion of the potential policy implications of Edwards); Bradford P. Anderson, Complete Harmony or Mere 
Detente? Shielding California Employees from Non-Competition Covenants, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 8 (2007) 
(arguing that California’s strong public policy against impinging employee mobility also weighs heavily against 
allowing the doctrine of inevitable disclosure in Edwards). 
74 See Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 19, at 321-22. 
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the reasonableness test to balance the rights of the parties to the contract, as well as to consider 
the policy impact and the public interest.75   
While noncompetes traditionally arise in the common law, there is a trend among many 
states to codify their noncompete policies.76  Several states are currently contemplating 
noncompete legislation, most notably Massachusetts77 and Illinois.78  Some, such as Texas,79 
have legislation outlining permissive boundaries for noncompetes. Others, such as Colorado,80 
                                                 
75 See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. APT Critical Systems, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Johnson 
Controls, the court commented that: 
In fashioning the [reasonableness] analysis, New York courts have endeavored to balance public 
policy concerns relating to the benefits of competition and the unfettered flow of talent and ideas 
in our economy with employers’ legitimate right to protect the fruits of their labor, the idea being 
that the proper balancing of these factors will produce the most wealth and innovation . . . for 
society. It is important to keep in mind, however, that on a less grand scale the interests to be 
balanced are those of the individual employer and employee. 
Id. at 533-34 (citation omitted). 
76 As of 2010, seventeen states had enacted some form of legislation addressing the enforceability of noncompete 
covenants. See Bishara, supra note 71. These states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, 
and Wisconsin. Other states, such as Tennessee and West Virginia, have basic antitrust statutes that are invoked 
when evaluating noncompetes. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-101, 47-18-104 (2011) (disfavors any contract 
attempting to lessen competition); W. VA. CODE § 47-18-3(a) (2011) (the state’s antitrust statute). 
77 See Will Brownsberger, Reform Noncompete Contracts, WILL BROWNSBERG—ST. REPRESENTATIVE, DEMOCRAT, 
24TH MIDDLESEX DISTRICT, http://willbrownsberger.com/index.php/end-noncompete-contracts (last visited Oct. 7, 
2011) (detailing state representative’s plan to resubmit his co-sponsored noncompete reform legislation to the 
Massachusetts legislature).  
78 See HB 0016 Introduced to Create an “Illinois Covenants Not to Compete Act,” WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (Jan. 
2011), http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/Updated_HB0016_Briefing.pdf. Like Massachusetts’s 
proposed legislation, Illinois’s version of noncompete reform seeks to formalize the bounds of the traditional 
reasonableness test by requiring the contract to be “narrowly tailored to support the protection of a legitimate 
business interest” and apply it to specific levels of employees. Id. The proposal also provides for rebuttable 
presumptions “that a that a restrictive covenant is not narrowly tailored to promote a legitimate business interest if”: 
(i) the covenant’s duration exceeds one year; (ii) the covenant’s geographic area extends beyond 
any region in which the key employee provides employment services during the one year 
preceding termination of the employment relationship; or (iii) the type of services covered by the 
covenant extends beyond the nature of the work performed by the key employee.  
Id. 
79 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.50 (2010) 
80 The Colorado statute is titled “Unlawful to intimidate worker - agreement not to compete,” and declares that “[i]t 
shall be unlawful to use force, threats, or other means of intimidation to prevent any person from engaging in any 
lawful occupation at any place he sees fit.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(1) (2010). However, subsection (2) 
provides several exceptions to this ban on noncompetes. Specifically, section (2) states: 
Any covenant not to compete which restricts the right of any person to receive compensation for 
performance of skilled or unskilled labor for any employer shall be void, but this subsection (2) 
shall not apply to: 
(a) Any contract for the purchase and sale of a business or the assets of a business; 
(b) Any contract for the protection of trade secrets; 
(c) Any contractual provision providing for recovery of the expense of educating and 
training an employee who has served an employer for a period of less than two years; 
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disfavor noncompetes or ban them with significant exceptions.  In addition, new research related 
to the effects of noncompetes has started to create a picture of the role of these mobility-
inhibiting contracts, which further sheds light on the possible economic role of restricting 
employee mobility.81 
The post-employment implications of noncompete enforcement are clear for an affected 
employee.82  He is limited—at least for an amount of time and a geographic or topical scope that 
a court finds to be reasonable—from going to work for a competitor of his former employer or 
from starting a competing business.  While an employee who is subject to an enforceable 
noncompete is prohibited from moving to a new position that is contrary to the terms of the 
contract, the employer has, at least in theory, already provided its consideration to support the 
agreement.83  In other words, the former employer does not normally have any additional 
obligations once the terms of the noncompete are triggered by the termination of employment.   
 Again, policymakers acknowledge that noncompetes are by nature anticompetitive and 
would normally be unenforceable as against public policy.84  Accordingly, most state courts will 
allow a covenant not to compete, but “only if it is necessary to protect a legitimate business 
interest, reasonably limited in time and space, and consonant with the public interest.”85  While 
the details vary by jurisdiction, legitimate protectable business interests may include investments 
in training and building the employee’s reputation; confidential and proprietary information, 
such as customer lists and strategies; and client relationships.86  In effect, most states recognize 
                                                                                                                                                             
(d) Executive and management personnel and officers and employees who constitute 
professional staff to executive and management personnel. 
Id. § 8-2-113(2). 
81 See, e.g., Bruce Fallick et al., Job Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Micro-Foundations 
of a High Technology Cluster, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 472 (2006) (measuring higher rates of employee mobility in 
Silicon Valley, California’s high-tech sector, as compared to other California industries or in a sample of states with 
enforcement of noncompetes); Garmaise, supra note 33 (finding jurisdictions that enforce noncompetes will create 
an environment that creates lower wages and less investment from employers in their employees); Matt Marx et al., 
Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009) (using a natural experiment 
created by a change in noncompete enforcement law to find lower rates of mobility under a policy of noncompete 
enforcement); Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 
48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 175 (2003) (studying the tendency of employees to become entrepreneurs after their employer-
firm undergoes a dramatic change using noncompetes as one variable). 
82 For discussion of the implications for other employees, see infra Part III.A.1 and accompanying footnotes.  
83 Some states do not require additional consideration when a noncompete is signed after employment has begun 
under a theory that continued employment or some additional terms or conditions of employment, such as a promise 
to modify an at will employment assumption, are sufficient. See, e.g., Lake Land Emp’t Grp. of Akron, LLC v. 
Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio 2004) (resolving a split in the state appellate courts by concluding that an employee 
continuing with an at-will employment relationship is sufficient consideration to support assent to a noncompete); 
Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540, 542 (Ohio 1991) (finding that a noncompete signed upon 
employer’s promise to formerly at-will employee to discharge the employee only for specified causes is sufficient 
consideration). However, other states may require new independent consideration to support a noncompete for 
continuing at-will employees but not for employees who are terminable for good cause, for whom mere continued 
employment is sufficient consideration. See, e.g., Stone v. Griffin Communications, 53 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
84 See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 592-93 (N.Y. 1976). 
85 Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 2004). 
86 See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 23, at 6.   
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that some enforcement of noncompetes, however limited, is allowable to protect the interests of 
employers in sharing confidential and proprietary knowledge with their employees.  This 
approach is consistent with the historical role of equity in adjudicating these disputes.87 
 In summary, even if a noncompete will lessen otherwise lawful competition and 
potentially inhibit the flow of knowledge, most states today will allow this compromise.  
Noncompetes can be controversial and have been consistently disputed in litigation.  Because 
noncompetes create the risk that employers will overreach and improperly shift costs to 
employees, the next sections discuss two alternative mechanisms that may still protect the 
employer’s interests, but have a more negative impact on employee’s freedom of mobility. 
 
B.  Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
 
A relatively resurgent concept that has yet to gain much traction in U.S. jurisprudence is the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine.88  The thrust of the concept is the assumption that a former 
employee who was privileged to acquire an employer’s confidential information or trade secret 
will inevitably use or disclose the knowledge in her new employment.89  Therefore, a judicial 
injunction is sought to prohibit the employee from beginning the new employment based on 
allegations of a threatened misappropriation, coupled with irreparable harm and, to some extent 
in various jurisdictions, bad faith.90  Essentially, a handful of states allow an employer to argue, 
even in the absence of a noncompete agreement, to “enjoin a departing employee from taking a 
job on the grounds that he or she will ‘inevitably disclose’ some unspecified trade secret.”91  
Inevitable disclosure developed in the common law and has seen a revival in its attempted 
application since the widespread adoption of the Uniform Trade Secret Act and, in particular, 
following the 1995 Seventh Circuit case of PepsiCo v. Redmond.92  In that case Redmond, the 
                                                 
87 See generally T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 
(2005) (reviewing the history and role of the courts in the equitable analysis of noncompetes and advocating for 
courts to balance competing interests of employers and employees when settling noncompete disputes). 
88 The doctrine also has not seen much treatment in the academic literature. Following resurgence in the debate over 
inevitable disclosure and its wider application to address threatened trade secret misappropriation in the mid 1990s, 
several student notes and comments addressed the topic. See, e.g., Jonathan O. Harris, Note, The Doctrine of 
Inevitable Disclosure: A Proposal to Balance Employer and Employee Interests, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 325 (2000);  
David Lincicum, Note, Inevitable Conflict: California’s Policy of Worker Mobility and the Doctrine of “Inevitable 
Disclosure,” 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1257 (2002); Jennifer L. Saulino, Note, Locating Inevitable Disclosure's Place in 
Trade Secret Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1184 (2002); Brandy L. Treadway, Comment, An Overview of Individual 
States’ Application of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REV. 621 (2002); 
Susan Street Whaley, Comment, The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 809 (1999). 
While these articles are useful, a full scholarly treatment of the subject in the business law literature is seemingly 
available only from Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 148-64. 
89 See Hyde, supra note 23, at 9 (criticizing New Jersey for a lack of venture capital or a culture or infrastructure of 
start-ups and pointing out that the state “vigorously enforces noncompetes” and is one of possibly three states that 
has supported an inevitable disclosure regime). 
90 See Eleanore R. Godfrey, Note, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee Mobility v. Employer’s 
Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 176-77 (2004).  
91 Id. at 9.  
92 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). For a detailed description of the PepsiCo case, the development of the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine, and its implications, see Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 148-164. 
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former executive, left PepsiCo for Quaker Oats, a competitor in the sports drink market.93  
Because PepsiCo believed Redmond would inevitably disclose confidential information and 
trade secrets related to pricing and marketing plans it brought suit and, eventually, was granted 
an injunction based on a theory of inevitable disclosure.94 
 While injunctive relief based on an inevitable disclosure theory may be rare, one can 
imagine an employer arguing for inevitable disclosure-based injunctive relief as part of the 
irreparable harm contemplated by a court when evaluating a request for a preliminary 
injunction.95  A court could be more amenable to the argument that irreparable harm will occur 
initially during a time-sensitive and short-term relief of a temporary restraining order.  In 
contrast, a long-term permanent restraining order seems less likely because of the potentially 
open-ended mobility restriction that would result. This concern would be particularly troubling if 
there were assurances that the trade secret will not be conveyed, perhaps because of an existing 
and enforceable nondisclosure agreement.   
However, where there is evidence of wrongdoing or behavior consistent with the 
misappropriation of trade secrets, a court may be more likely to restrict the departing employee’s 
choice of mobility under a theory of inevitable disclosure.  For instance, in Bimbo Bakeries, Inc. 
v. Botticella, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to review a trade secret 
misappropriation case where a departing executive was one of only a few individuals with access 
to the plaintiff’s trade secret, the process for creating famous Thomas’ English Muffins “nooks 
and crannies.”96  In the absence of a noncompete (presumably because the original employment 
had been in California), the appellate court reviewed the trial court’s grant of a preliminary 
injunction prohibiting the employee from working for a competitor.   After secretly accepting 
employment with a competitor, the employee-defendant had continued to work for the plaintiff 
for some time in a knowledge-sensitive role.97  Even though the employee had signed a 
“Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Invention Assignment Agreement,”98 the court upheld the 
injunction under a theory of inevitable disclosure, at least in the short term.99  
Interestingly, the Bimbo court added that there were multiple issues of public interest at 
play in such a case, including upholding the sanctity of confidentiality agreements and protecting 
trade secrets.100  The court also listed several additional interests, including “a public interest in 
employers being free to hire whom they please and in employees being free to work for whom 
                                                 
93 Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 153. 
94 Id. 
95 Some sources assert that only a few states have embraced inevitable disclosure. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 23, at 
9 (harshly criticizing New Jersey for allowing inevitable disclosure arguments and stating that perhaps three states 
subscribe to the inevitable disclosure doctrine). But see Treadway, supra note 88, at 626-49 (finding in 2002 that 
eight states had adopted the doctrine, four states lacked definitive case law on the subject, six states adopted a 
limited version of the doctrine, and three states had rejected it outright). 
96 Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3rd Cir. 2010). 
97 Id. at 105-06. 
98 Id. at 105. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 119. 
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they please” and citing with approval Pennsylvania precedents that had articulated “a societal 
interest in employee mobility.”101 
 As discussed below, criticism of inevitable disclosure from an ethical perspective is 
perhaps easier than a critique of noncompetes, because the inevitable disclosure logic allows an 
employer to restrict mobility without ever bargaining or paying for the right to restrict a 
knowledge transfer, even when that improper knowledge transfer is subconscious.102  Since it is 
not a contract-based remedy, an employer seeking inevitable disclosure protection is essentially 
arguing for a default rule to protect its intellectual property as captured in a trade secret even 
before there is evidence of misappropriation of that secret.  The employer, thus, must ask for a 
court to determine that a former employee will eventually, even unconsciously, divulge or 
otherwise use the trade secret in competition.  In effect, the remedy is a prohibition on the former 
employee going to work for a competitor where the trade secret will surely be used sooner or 
later. 
Perhaps worse, the implication is that, with an application of inevitable disclosure, the 
restriction on mobility is not bounded in time and geographic scope, as is the case with a 
noncompete term that is subject to a reasonableness test.  To the contrary, the information that is 
the subject of the trade secret in an inevitable disclosure action will be protectable—and thus the 
grounds to prevent the employee from moving freely—for some indefinite period that could be 
as long as the information remains a bona fide trade secret giving firm a competitive advantage.   
Having discussed our concerns thus far with the doctrine of inevitable disclosure and 
covenants not to compete, we now turn to garden leave, a less well-known contractual tool that 
also is designed to restrict employee mobility. 
 
C. Garden Leave 
 
Garden leave, also sometimes called gardening leave, is a relatively new mechanism for limiting 
post-employment mobility.  Originally a concept in British law, there is some evidence it is 
beginning to be used in the United States.103  Like a noncompete, but unlike the doctrine of 
inevitable disclosure, garden leave is a contract-based restriction on mobility, which results from 
the parties’ negotiation.  There are few discussions of garden leave in the U.S. academic 
                                                 
101 Id. (citing Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434-35 (Pa. 1960)). 
102 See Robin Feldman, The Role of the Subconscious in Intellectual Property Law, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 
12-14 (2010) (commenting that inevitable disclosure may initially appear to conflict with a trade secret approach to 
limiting knowledge transfer, but that “[w]ith general skills and knowledge, the law recognizes the difficulty of 
limiting the subconscious, declaring the information beyond the bounds of trade secret law and giving the employee 
free reign to use the information in a new job”). Feldman adds that, in the case of inevitable disclosure, “the law also 
recognizes the difficulty of limiting the subconscious, but this time, it drastically limits the employee’s freedom, 
restricting the employee from taking a related job.” Id. at 13. 
103 See generally Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability of 
Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291 (2002) (“Garden leave may provide a solution to the 
prevailing uncertainty regarding the enforceability of restrictive covenants in the United States. Whether it will do so 
is a question that remains to be answered. Having observed the efficacy of such provisions across the Atlantic, many 
American employers in competitive industries have begun putting garden leave clauses into the contracts of their 
own key employees in hope that these provisions will prove to be more reliably enforceable than have the traditional 
post-employment restrictive covenants. As yet, however, American courts have not ruled on the legitimacy of 
garden leave provisions.”). 
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literature,104 although both media105 and practitioners106 have noted its increasing use by U.S. 
employers for various types of employees.  
              In the case of garden leave, “the employee agrees to give notice some months prior to 
departure—say, six months—during which period the employer must pay the employee's salary 
but may choose not to assign any duties, and in any event may prevent the employee from 
working elsewhere.”107  Thus, rather than leaving the employer and immediately beginning work 
for a competing enterprise, the employee is paid to remain at home and, at least metaphorically, 
work only in her garden.  Accordingly, garden leave serves as a “means of avoiding the restraints 
on specific performance” because “the employer . . . contract[s] for a relatively long period of 
notice by the employee to terminate the employment, and . . . pay[s] the employee’s salary 
during this period without requiring the employee to come into work . . . on the assumption that 
the employee will have to stay home and work in the garden, but will be financially secure until 
the period of notice expires and he or she is then free to work for the competitor.”108  
 Garden leave is like a noncompete in that it protects an employer’s interest in information 
by limiting employee mobility, but it has the extra advantage of forcing the employer to bear 
those costs, post-employment, which compensates the employee.  Thus, because the employer 
has an immediate and tangible cost to restricting mobility, the employer will refrain from using 
garden leave to restrict the mobility of lower-level employees who do not really have 
confidential knowledge.  Moreover, employers will avoid paying garden leave even to top 
managers for longer than is necessary to protect valuable knowledge.  It is, therefore, less subject 
than a noncompete to the criticism that an employee’s right to earn a living is ignored.   
 The uncertainty and troublesome aspects of noncompetes have, not surprisingly, made 
the garden leave option more attractive in some ways to protect both employer and employee 
interests.  As one set of practical advice from corporate lawyers has framed these issues: 
 
American courts usually enforce noncompetes only when they are reasonable and protect 
an employer’s legitimate business interest.  As many courts value free mobility of 
employees and open and fair competition, courts are commonly cautious when deciding 
                                                 
104 An August 2011 search of all law journals for all available years in the LexisNexis database reveals only about 
15 scholarly articles mentioning garden leave in a substantive manner, and several of those exclusively deal with the 
Australian or British legal systems. Most of these articles merely cite a 2002 student note by Greg Lembrich. See id. 
At the time of that article, Lembrich’s research indicated, “American courts have not ruled on the legitimacy of 
garden leave provisions.” Id. at 2293. He added that “American commentators have also been slow to address 
garden leave as a potential solution to the problem [of uncertain noncompete enforcement]” and that only a few U.S. 
practitioner articles had addressed the subject. Id. at 2293 n.5. 
105 See, e.g., Joe Rauch, BofA's U.S. Trust Adding "Garden Leave" for Some, REUTERS (Feb 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/18/us-bankofamerica-ustrust-idUSTRE71H4OZ20110218; Son, supra note 
7. 
106 See, e.g., Thomas B. Lewis & Mark F. Kowal, Garden Leave Provisions: A Growing Trend in Employment 
Agreements, N.J. L. J., Apr. 18, 2011, at S-12, available at 
http://www.njlawblog.com/uploads/file/TBL%20MFK%20-%20NJLJ%20-%204_18_11.pdf; Christopher P. Stief, 
What In-House Counsel Should Know About 'Garden Leave' Clauses, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Oct. 22, 2008), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202425435456 (reporting that “‘garden leave’ employment 
agreements start to bloom in the United States”). 
107 Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a 
Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 379, 425 (2006). 
108 Bob Hepple, The Duty of Employee Loyalty in English Law, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 205, 214 (1999). 
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the scope and/or enforceability of noncompetes. This uncertainty has created an 
environment where employers may be unable to sufficiently protect their interests against 
departing, well-trained, highly productive employees.  A “garden leave provision” may 
effectively protect the legitimate interests of the business while not causing a financial 
hardship to the employee.109 
 
In light of the potential mutual benefits to both employers and employees provided by garden 
leave, and because it is less controversial than noncompete restrictions, these provisions may 
prove to be a popular alternative to other mobility-inhibiting mechanisms.110   
 Accordingly, how to determine the proper public policy balance between protecting 
employee mobility and regulating sensitive knowledge flows through endorsing noncompetes, 
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, or garden leave remains an open question for courts and 
legislatures.  In the next section, we go beyond simply examining the legal enforcement and 
business efficiency questions about restricting employees’ post-employment mobility and 
address questions about the business ethics of such restrictions. 
 
III.  AN ETHICS CRITIQUE OF RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYEE MOBILITY 
  
Lawmakers drafting legislation addressing employee mobility restrictions, as well as judges 
officiating in litigation to enforce them, may allude to various philosophical arguments in 
determining the reasonableness and public policy impacts of such measures.  For example, the 
first step of the three-pronged test for reasonableness of noncompetes111 evaluates whether 
legitimate business interests are implicated, alluding to the existence of competing property 
rights.112  The second step assesses hardship on the employee,113 which suggests that concerns 
over fairness and equity may be at issue.114  The final step considers the effect on the general 
public,115 indicating the relevance of a utilitarian analysis—weighing the social costs and 
benefits of enforcing a noncompete.116  However, lawmakers and judges may not have 
                                                 
109 Lewis & Kowal, supra note 106, at S-12. 
110 See, e.g., Lembrich, supra note 103, at 2314-19 (discussing several reasons why U.S. courts may find enforcing 
garden leave provisions preferable to enforcing noncompetes).  
111 BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999). 
112 See e.g., Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. Forest Flavors Int’l, Inc., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11786 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(unpublished decision) (addressing the enforcement of a noncompete where the issue concerned who owned 
property rights in trade secrets involving the process of manufacturing liquid smoke); F.S. New Products, Inc. v. 
Strong Indus., Inc., 129 S.W.3d 606, 630-31 (Tex. App. 2004) (discussing how a noncompete applies to property 
rights in an employee’s knowledge concerning the design and manufacture of trailing axle assemblies). 
113 See BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1223. 
114 See e.g., Iowa Glass Depot, Inc. v. Jindrich, 338 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1983) (“[W]e are required to consider the 
employee’s situation and the surrounding circumstances in order to fairly weigh the interests of the parties.”); 
Holland v. Brown, 156 A. 168 (Pa. 1931) (discussing whether the geographic limitation of the non-compete 
agreement “affords a fair protection to plaintiffs and does not oppress defendants”). 
115 See BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1223. 
116 See e.g., Marsh USA, Inc. v. Cook, 54 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 1234, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 465 (Tex. 2011). In Marsh USA 
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Scholars have suggested that John Locke’s concepts of property rights in one’s labor and the 
freedom to contract out one’s labor to others underlie U.S. employment law.119  Locke, in his 
Second Treatise on Government, spoke of the basis for property rights being deduced on a moral 
basis from natural law.  According to Locke, natural law suggests that “every Man has a 
Property in his own Person. . . . The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may 
say, are properly his.”120  This natural property right that all persons have in their labor is 
necessary for subsistence and arises from every person’s natural right to self-preservation.121  
Locke finds there is not only an individual right to self-preservation but there is also an 
obligation on others to respect each person’s right to self-preservation.  Locke derives this right 
for self-preservation from the argument that humans were created as God’s servants, to survive 
at His pleasure rather than at one another’s pleasure.122  For purposes of self-preservation, 
mankind has the right to procure from the commons the food and drink and whatever else is 
necessary for survival.123  Thus, according to Locke, there is a moral basis for individuals to have 
property interests in their own bodies and labor, the returns of which naturally belong to those 
individuals.   
 When it comes to one’s property rights in one’s self, Locke suggests that under the terms 
of natural law, “man . . . cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor 
put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another . . . .”124  Nevertheless, Locke 
recognizes that an individual has the freedom to trade or exchange property that is the fruit of his 
labor, as well as trading the labor itself.  Thus, in “a state of perfect freedom [men are free] to 
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the 
bounds of the law of nature . . . .”125  In this light, Locke recognizes that a man is free to sell his 
                                                 
119 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 21 
(1992) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS] (“Although that notion of ownership [of one’s own labor] did 
not mean that every person could do exactly what he wanted, it did mean that no person could commandeer the labor 
of another for his own private use. The ability to use the talents of other persons depended not on coercion but rather 
on consent—including consent that was purchased in voluntary transactions.”) see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES]. 
120 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 18.  
121 Id. at 4-5 (“Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully; so by the like 
reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of 
mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the 
preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.”). 
122 Id. at 4 (“[N]o one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the 
workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the 
world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during 
his, not one another's pleasure.”). 
123 Id. at 17-18 (“Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to their 
preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature affords for their subsistence . . . 
.”). 
124 Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted). This position has been criticized in the literature, given that Locke invested in the 
slave trade and had a role in drafting the Carolina constitution, which accounts for the practice of slavery. See, e.g., 
Jennifer Welchman, Locke on Slavery and Inalienable Rights, 25 CAN. J. PHIL. 67 (1995).  
125 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
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services for wages, which “gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater, 
than what is contained in the contract between ‘em.”126   
 In this way, the concept of freedom to contract becomes relevant in Locke’s philosophy, 
as well as the strict interpretation of contractual terms.  During the time of the contract between 
master (employer) and servant (employee), Locke indicates that the labor of the servant belongs 
completely to the master:  “Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; . . . 
become my property. . . . The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state 
they were in, hath fixed my property in them.”127  These clauses are relevant to a consideration of 
legal restrictions on employee mobility from a rights-based ethical framework. 
 The master’s (employer’s) ownership of the product of the servant’s (employee’s) labor 
is well recognized today.  Modern scholars acknowledge that businesses can have property rights 
in the capital, technology, and information used by employees to contribute productively to the 
business, as well as property rights to the results of the employee’s production.128  Nevertheless, 
Werhane suggests that property rights are secondary to more fundamental moral rights, such as 
freedom and the equal opportunity to self-development.129 These more fundamental rights may 
bring about the necessity for compromise when it comes to protecting property rights.  These 
considerations are relevant in the evaluation of public policy on legal restrictions to employee 
mobility, as discussed in the following sections.     
 
1.  Noncompetes 
 
Under Locke’s concept of freedom to contract labor services, individuals are free to agree to 
contractual terms detailing the duration and extent of the relationship between master and 
servant.  When it comes to noncompetes, however, what is at issue is the ownership and 
deployment of the productive capacity represented by the employee’s knowledge, skills, and 
talents beyond the termination of the labor contract.  Noncompetes controversially allow the 
former employer to assert a continuing right in restricting the employee’s use of that productive 
capacity after the employee is no longer working for that employer, nor receiving continued 
compensation, nor bound by the normal common law duties of loyalty to a current employer.130 
 Obviously, this continuing, postcontractual right is quite valuable to the employer, intent 
on reducing the threat of competition after an employment contract is terminated and an 
employee has departed.  But noncompetes can also be beneficial to employers even while the 
employment contract is still in force.  Noncompetes allow the employer to increase the 
predictability of access to an important resource, in this case a human resource, by raising the 
                                                 
126 Id at 50 (emphasis omitted). 
127 Id at 19. 
128 See, e.g., PATRICIA H. WERHANE, TARA J. RADIN & NORMAN E. BOWIE, EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 
(2004); PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS at 21(1985) [hereinafter WERHANE, 
PERSONS, RIGHTS]. 
129 WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, supra note 128, at 21-22 (“It must be acknowledged, however, that private 
ownership is not on a par with the most basic rights. . . . What we wish to show is that a private enterprise economic 
system that recognizes private ownership as a moral right is not antithetical to individual liberty, in particular the 
freedom to develop autonomously one’s own life.”).  
130 See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of 
Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1182-85 (2001); supra Part II.A.  
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opportunity cost of the employee leaving to work for a competitor.131  In other words, this is a 
strategy for reducing the “flight risk” of valuable employee assets.  Accordingly, with the greater 
certainty of staffing that comes with an enforceable noncompete, an employer is more likely to 
invest in the employee by investing in valuable human capital.132  Noncompetes are also 
important to employers in that they can be used defensively when they contain antipoaching or 
antiraiding provisions that not only prohibit a former employee from competing, but also prevent 
the employee from eviscerating the former employer’s staff by luring away the best and brightest 
workers. 
 An additional argument supporting these restrictions is that a noncompete is a contract 
clause that, like any contractual issue, is binding only upon mutual consent.  Locke suggests that 
an individual has the freedom to consent to any agreement to sell her labor services—that is, to 
become a servant to a master, or an employee to an employer.133  Where consent is given, the 
fruits of the employee’s labor belong to the employer to the full extent of the agreed upon 
contractual terms.134  The initial question that begs to be answered is, how does one define 
consent?  Locke asserts natural law limits on the freedom to contract at the point where doing so 
would involve consenting to arbitrary constraints on an individual’s right to liberty, such as 
constraints amounting to enslavement or constraints on an individual’s right to subsistence and 
self-preservation.135  As has been noted, the definition of consent can be troublesome because 
consent comes very close to coercion when one agrees to go along with an action due to lack of 
information or simply because no other feasible option is available.136  Yet as discussed below, 
because of unequal bargaining power, employees often find they are required to sign 
nonnegotiable, boilerplate noncompetes if they want to keep their jobs.137   
 Professor Richard Epstein has evaluated how Locke’s concepts of property rights in one’s 
labor and the freedom to contract out one’s labor to others underlie U.S. employment law.138  
Under freedom of contract, there may be an assumption that employers and employees agree to 
complete contracts, with all the terms fully negotiated, understood, and spelled out.139  In this 
                                                 
131 See generally Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 93 
96-99 (1981) (analyzing restrictive employment covenants in terms of the distribution of training costs and the 
incentives that training creates). 
132 See Bishara, supra note 72, at 304.  
133 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 3. 
134 Id. at 50. 
135 Id.; see also id. at 15-16. 
136 Michael Keeley, Continuing the Social Contract Tradition, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 241, 241 (1995) (questioning “the 
concept of consent as a viable ethical criterion” and arguing “for an alternate principle of impartiality as a more 
appropriate moral norm in a social contract theory of organizations”) 
137 See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form Employment 
Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 649 n.60 (2007) (“Courts have generally rejected claims brought by employees 
fired for refusing to sign a noncompete.” (citing Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc'ns, Inc., 846 A.2d 604, 611 
(N.J. 2004) (holding that termination for refusal to sign overbroad noncompete did not give rise to claim of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy))). 
138 See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 119, at 21. 
139 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 955 (1984). But cf. Mark 
Roehling & Wendy Boswell, “Good Cause Beliefs” in an “At-Will World”?: A Focused Investigation of 
Psychological Versus Legal Contracts, 16 EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 211 (2004) (revealing that employees’ beliefs 
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sense, if an employee accepts in advance that a noncompete covenant is part of the bargain, is the 
subsequent enforcement of that agreement a violation of the employee’s rights?  In a Lockean 
freedom to contract world, the answer may be “no”; otherwise, what is the point of such 
contracts?  However, it seems inconsistent with a Lockean concept of property in one’s person to 
hold a noncompete clause to be binding when the terms of the contract were not presented until 
after one started working, which is when one has declined any other prospective job offers.  
Further, is it even possible for the employee to consent to a noncompete covenant if she does not 
fully understand what she may be giving away at some future point?  To what extent would an 
employee truly understand the value of her skills at some unspecified point in the future?  Even 
if the employee were to have full awareness of the rights she is giving away in a noncompete, 
there is the question of whether the employee has an equal and free ability to negotiate these 
terms.  As discussed below, several critiques have been put forward regarding the employee’s 
consent to waive of future rights, as occurs with a noncompete.  Next, we will consider how a 
rights-based perspective might weigh in on these debates. 
 Freedom of contract assumes that the terms of a contract are freely negotiated.  However, 
in the current employment context, the terms of a noncompete are not necessarily open for 
negotiation.  As such,  
 
The new model of private ordering in employment relies on boilerplate documents, 
unilaterally drafted by the employer and presented as a condition of employment, often 
subsequent to the start of work.  Their purpose is not to memorialize a negotiated set of 
terms, but to extract waivers of rights, thus realigning statutory and default rules to better 
reflect employers’ interests.140   
 
Stone suggests that earlier in history, courts were very suspicions of noncompetes in employment 
relationships because “they were often the result of vastly uneven bargaining power and thus 
contracts of adhesion.”141  The tides have shifted, though, and many authors have discussed the 
legal and ethical implications of differences in bargaining power between employees and 
employers.142   
 Many factors may limit an employee’s ability to negotiate the terms of a noncompete 
agreement.  For example, the employer’s timing in proffering the noncompete may affect the 
balance of bargaining power.  As Arnow-Richman notes, the employer can require the employee 
                                                                                                                                                             
regarding job security are much stronger than the rights reflected in the terms of their contracts, based on an 
empirical exploration comparing employees’ assumptions about their employment contracts to the actual legal 
contractual terms). 
140 Arnow-Richman, supra note 137, at 639. 
141 Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing 
Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 721-63 (2001). 
142 See, e.g., Gerhard Blickle & Alexander Witzki, New Psychological Contracts in the World of Work: Economic 
Citizens or Victims of the Market?, 3 SOC’Y & BUS. REV. 149 (2008) (describing the underlying causes for changes 
in employment conditions and presenting empirical findings on individuals coping with career changes); David Hart 
& Jeffrey Thompson, Untangling Employee Loyalty: A Psychological Contract Perspective, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 297 
(2007) (viewing loyalty as a cognitive phenomenon; presenting a framework that defines the construct; and 
anticipating obligations and asymmetries in loyalty); Pauline T. Kim, A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal 
Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997) (finding that workers overwhelmingly 
misunderstand legal rules governing employment relationships, overestimating job protections and employee rights). 
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to sign a noncompete at the point when the employee accepts the job, or at some point after the 
employee has started working.143  Cognitive reasons may make it difficult for an employee to 
fully appreciate what she is agreeing to in signing a noncompete when she accepts a job.144  At 
the beginning of an employment relationship, employees tend to be optimistic about their future 
with that firm.145  This has been compared to the period of courtship, where a suitor is unlikely to 
raise questions about the end of the relationship and risk appearing not committed to its 
success.146  At the start of an employment relationship, employees are not likely to be 
anticipating reasons they might be later interested in an employment opportunity with another 
employer, or at least they are reluctant to acknowledge that when starting a new job.  In addition, 
at the outset, employees may not anticipate the hardship of being unable to work in their chosen 
field for up to a year, or maybe even for three years.147  Employees are not likely to think about 
the fact that their skills could be rendered obsolete if they are required to spend a significant 
amount of time outside of their field, which could damage their future ability to sell their skills 
and services to other employers.   
 Noncompetes are also often required as a condition of continued employment when an 
employee has already been working for the firm for some time.  It may be more difficult for the 
employee to decline to sign a noncompete agreement, as she has not been on the job market 
recently and does not readily have other employment options.  In many states, an offer of 
continued employment is legitimate consideration for signing a noncompete,148 meaning that the 
employee may be in the position of having to sign the agreement or immediately leave the 
firm.149  This take-it-or-leave-it approach certainly limits employee bargaining power to 
negotiate the terms of a noncompete.  By contrast, the bargaining power prior to employment is 
perhaps not as limited because, at least at that moment, the employee could turn down the 
employment offer.  Although this may be unrealistic in that the employee may still have 
difficulty in properly valuing the cost of a restriction that is buried among other terms in the 
agreement and that is not triggered until the potentially distant termination. 
                                                 
143 Arnow-Richman, supra note 137, at 639. 
144 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 
251-252 (1995) (showing that limits of cognition explain many limits on the bargain principle, that a contracting 
party will act with full cognition to rationally maximize his subjective expected utility). Eisenberg argues that 
classes of contract provisions and classes of contracts, such as employment contracts, are systematically affected by 
the limits of cognition, such that the premise of the bargain principle is not fulfilled. Id. 
145 Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 873, 891-92 (2010).  
146 Id. at 891 & n.58 (citing Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common 
Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1794-95 (1996)). 
147 See Moffat, supra note 145, at 886 & n.43 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. g (1981)). 
Moffat notes that “[t]he drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law have apparently struggled with the 
proper approach to take. The draft provision permits limited enforcement of noncompetes, and it does not appear to 
acknowledge the bargaining process concerns.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.06 
(Preliminary Draft Nov. 7, 2010)). 
148 See Bishara, supra note 71, at 776, 792 fig.10 (mentioning the policies of some states that provide for continued 
employment to serve as sufficient legal consideration for a covenant not to compete). 
149 See O’Neill, supra note 14, at 84 (arguing that courts should “minimiz[e] the enforcement of covenants not to 
compete where the assenting employee lacks significant bargaining power while preserving employers’ abilities to 
enforce these covenants against employees who enjoy such power” as a safeguard for vulnerable employees). 
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 Noncompete clauses also may be proffered at the end of an employment relationship.  
Which party holds the stronger bargaining power could completely depend upon the 
circumstances—for instance, whether the employer or employee is about to terminate the 
relationship.  Where the employee is planning to move on to another job, she may have little 
incentive to offer the employer any protection against unfair competition.  But, where the 
employee has been fired, the employer holds all the bargaining power, and the employee may be 
fully cognizant of the hardship that a noncompete may bring as she anticipates a stretch of time 
without employment in her chosen field.150   
 Some argue that public policy does not favor limitations of employee mobility; however, 
evidence suggests that litigation to enforce noncompetes is more prevalent than ever before, and 
courts are more likely than before to uphold them.151  Given the implications of a knowledge-
based economy,152 there is little surprise that courts might favor employers’ interests to a greater 
extent.  Further, emboldened by their strong negotiating position employers may draft extensive 
noncompete clauses, which if reviewed in litigation, might be found unreasonable by the courts.  
In states where “blue-penciling” contract modification is permitted, there is no risk to the 
employer who overreaches because courts will not throw out an unreasonable noncompete, but 
rather will redraft the clause to comport with what the court finds to be reasonable.153  Where 
boilerplate noncompete terms are used and the employee’s costs of challenging the noncompete 
restrictions in court, as well as the uncertainty of the outcome of a judge’s decision, are both 
unbearably high, this might have a chilling effect on any employee’s interest in fighting against 
the terms or seeking alternative employment in their field.154 
 Regardless of when the noncompete was signed by the parties, the enforcement of a 
noncompete is triggered only at the point of a decision, on either side, to end the employment 
relationship. At that point, the employee may acquiesce to the terms of the agreement without a 
fight or ignore it, causing the employer to go to court to enforce the noncompete.155  The court 
process can be lengthy and costly for both parties, and the court’s determination of what is 
reasonable in the circumstances can produce an outcome that neither party expected.  Thus, in 
any particular circumstance where parties sign a noncompete agreement, the actual impact of the 
clause and, therefore, what the employer and employee are consenting to would be more and 
more uncertain the farther removed the parties are from the point of both contract signature and 
the triggering event. 
                                                 
150 Id.  
151 Bishara, supra note 72, at 290 n.6. 
152 See Bishara & Orozco, supra note 51. 
153 See Bishara, supra note 71, at 776-77. 
154 See Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that a noncompete “can be a 
powerful weapon in the hands of an employer [as] the risk of litigation alone may have a chilling effect on the 
employee”); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of Employee 
Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963 (2006) (“[C]ubewrap 
noncompetes succeed in further diluting an employee's already tenuous grip on any form of bargaining power. They 
strip away the worker's ability, both at the outset and during the course of employment, to refuse to deal.”); Stewart 
E. Sterk, Restraints on the Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 410 (1993) (observing that “by 
limiting the number of attractive alternatives available to an employee, a restrictive covenant may . . . ‘coerce’ that 
employee to remain with his initial employer”). 
155 See supra Part II.A. (describing the noncompete enforcement procedures).  
28 Vol. 49  /  American Business Law Journal 
 The rights-based perspective may not anticipate the difficulties of the nature of consent 
versus coercion, because freedom to contract is arguably natural right to be exercised by 
individuals as equals.156  In a master-servant relationship such as that of an employer-employee, 
the contract transfers powers over the servant to the master, to the extent of the time period and 
other terms consented upon by parties to the contract.  Even with consent, under a rights-based 
perspective the actual outcome may be bounded by the party’s absolute and fundamental rights, 
such as Locke’s preclusion against enslaving oneself157 and the right prioritized by Werhane to 
self-development.158   
 Thus, the weaknesses of noncompetes from the rights-based perspective include (1) a 
failure to resolve the issues of employee consent versus coercion to protect against employer 
overreaching; (2) questions about the employee’s ability to develop herself and make a living 
from her property rights in her own productive capability; and (3) a failure to gain certainty 
about protection of the employer’s property rights to competitive information such as trade 
secrets.  Greater certainty and better protection of the interests of both sides would be more 
beneficial for society.  Next we will consider a rights-based point of view on two other forms of 
employee-mobility restrictions to determine whether these mechanisms better ensure that 
interests in certainty and protection of property rights are available to both employers and 
employees. 
 
2.  Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
 
As discussed above, the inevitable disclosure doctrine results in a judicially enforced injunction 
giving employers rights to restrict employee mobility beyond the term of the employment 
contract.159  The doctrine provides that “employers may enjoin a departing employee from taking 
a job on the grounds that he or she will ‘inevitably disclose’ some unspecified trade secret.”160  
This doctrine is intended primarily to prevent the employee from revealing information like a 
trade secret that is the property of the employer, where revelation of that information would 
decrease its value and/or impair the employer’s competitiveness.161  Accordingly, an employer 
may restrict a former employee from joining a competitor if disclosure of confidential 
information would be inevitable in that new employment setting.  The doctrine does not 
specifically have the goal of restraining the productive capacity of the employee, although that is 
the ultimate effect.  Consideration of this doctrine implicates both the rights-based concerns for 
protecting employer’s property rights on the one hand, and the employee’s right to self-
development on the other.  
 Where the employer has invested efforts in developing the information as valued property 
(e.g., trade secrets) and relies upon the property for continued competitiveness, Lockean analysis 
would support the employer’s right to protect that property from the encroachment of others.162  
                                                 
156 See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 119, at 20-27. 
157 See LOCKE, supra note 2, at 15. 
158 See WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, supra note 128, at 18-19. 
159 See Hyde, supra note 23, at 6. 
160 Id. at 9. 
161 Id. 
162 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 18-24. 
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Locke posits that ownership requires continued use of property.163  Thus, when at issue is the 
employer’s company information related to its competitive strategy, Lockean analysis could be 
used to defend measures to protect that property. 
 Alternatively, because the ultimate effect of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is to hinder 
the former employee’s ability to use his skills in the type of work that may be his highest 
productive capacity, this doctrine bumps up against two important rights considerations: first, the 
right of individuals to protect their own self-preservation and, second, the freedom of contract as 
applied to the terms of the master-servant relationship.164  Criticism of inevitable disclosure is 
perhaps even easier than critiques of noncompetes because the inevitable disclosure logic allows 
an employer to restrict mobility without ever bargaining or paying for the right to restrict a 
knowledge transfer.  As discussed above, Locke specifies that an agreement to sell one’s services 
gives the “master” limited power only as contained in the contract.165  Given that the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine gives the employer powers over the employee that are not covered by an 
agreement between them, Locke’s view of freedom to contract would be undermined by the 
employer’s ability to restrict employment opportunities under the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine.166  Moreover, Locke argues for an individual right to self-preservation, as well as an 
obligation on others to respect each person’s right to self-preservation, and against any attempt to 
“take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, liberty, health, limb, 
or goods of another.”167  The rule of inevitable disclosure could potentially be used to block an 
employee indefinitely from work in his chosen field, for as long as the employer’s information 
(e.g., trade secrets) is protected property.  Thus, to the extent the employee’s right of self-
preservation is injured by actions of the employer that step beyond the agreed-upon terms of 
their relationship, a Lockean analysis would find the doctrine of inevitable disclosure lacking. 
  
3.  Garden Leave 
 
The concept of garden leave accomplishes many of the goals sought under the other employee 
mobility constraints discussed above, without incurring many of the negative impacts on the 
freedom of contract and the right of self-preservation.  Locke’s key concern of protecting 
property rights is ensured yet appropriately limited in duration by the price mechanism.  
Freedom of contract is promoted in this instance because the details of the garden leave would be 
set forth in an initial employment contract to which both parties consent.  Whereas the 
noncompete clause provides the employer with unilateral rights and binds the employee with 
duties, the garden leave agreement generates bilateral rights and duties on the part of both the 
                                                 
163 Id. at 24 (“[W]hatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his 
peculiar right . . . . But if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting 
perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth, notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to 
be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other.”). 
164 Id. at 17, 50. 
165 Id. at 50. 
166 While property rights and freedom of contract are valued in Lockean analysis, Epstein suggests that a limited role 
for the state in ensuring these rights is preferable. As Epstein notes, “The unquestioned right to quit or to fire has 
powerful and desirable incentive effects. In particular, it serves as an effective check against the advantage-taking 
open to either side in a continuous relationship.” EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 119, at 159. 
167 LOCKE, supra note 2, at 5. 
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employer and employee.168  For this reason, garden leave provides mechanisms to protect each 
party’s property rights, while limiting overreaching on either side.  The employer’s interest in 
protecting property rights in competitive information is ensured, and that protection lasts only for 
the period of time that the employer is willing to pay compensation (the price mechanism).  The 
employee preserves her interest in making a living and protecting her rights to her productive 
capacity in the long run.  In the short run, although the employee would not actively use her 
productive capacity in her chosen field, she would be fairly compensated for that period.  Finally, 
where the contract very clearly establishes the relevant duration of garden leave, there would be 
a limited role of the state and a lower level of scrutiny in adjudicating the employer-employee 
relationship.169  From a Lockean point of view, the garden leave mechanism may be better in 
preserving the bilateral rights of the individuals involved.  Moreover, it is consistent with the 
Lockean natural rights tradition, “which protects natural property rights and allows the state to 
restrict them only as necessary to protect the property owner and his property from force and 
fraud.”170 
 
B.  Utilitarian View 
  
While a Lockean analysis focuses on individual rights with a limited role for the state, a 
utilitarian perspective can be used to determine whether employee mobility restrictions are 
beneficial from a public policy perspective.  Utilitarian analysis typically takes an ends-based, 
rather than means-based view to evaluate the morality of an outcome, with the goal of producing 
the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.171  Generally, utilitarian 
theory applies a cost-benefit analysis not only to the interests of individual parties but also to the 
overall outcomes for society.172  Thus, to determine the ethics of mobility restrictions we could 
weigh the benefit gained by employers, employees, and greater society through permitting the 
                                                 
168 During the mandatory notice period, the garden leave agreement requires the employee to continue employment 
with employer—with all the attendant duties of loyalty—while the employer is required to continue paying the 
salary and benefits due to the employee under the contract. See, e.g., Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage, Inc., 633 
N.Y.S.2d 926, 930 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding a garden leave provision reasonable and explicitly noting that the 
payment of base salary "protects the employee's livelihood").  
169 See Daniel J. Raker, A Lower Level of Scrutiny?: New Alternatives for an Effective Restraint on Competitive 
Activity, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 751 (2008). 
170 James E. Macdonald & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, A Natural Law Defense to the Employment Law Question: A 
Response to Richard Epstein, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 363, 410 (2001). 
171 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Oskar Priest ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1957) (1863). Mills 
refines and develops the philosophical proposal of Jeremy Bentham (utilitarianism), which  is a moral theory based 
on the principle that an action is morally right if its consequences lead to happiness (absence of pain) and wrong if it 
ends in unhappiness (pain). Id.  
172 It has been recognized that delimiting the community or population to be considered in determining the greatest 
good in a utilitarian analysis is problematic.  See e.g. Gerald J. Postema, Interests, Universal and Particular: Jeremy 
Bentham's Utilitarian Theory of Value. 18 UTILITAS 109, 129 (2006) (“[S]erving particular interests is not the 
sort of enterprise that one can get all the others in the community to join. It is precisely because particular 
interests may point in very different directions, that the universal interest is normative for the community 
taken together; any alternative will serve only some insufficiently extended sub-group, at the expense of 
others.”).   Further, for a consideration of whether the greatest good may be determined in an aggregative manner or 
whether egalitarian distribution is possible under utilitarian thought, see Robert Audi, Can Utilitarianism Be 
Distributive? Maximization and Distribution as Criteria in Managerial Decisions, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 593(2007). 
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enforcement of each type of restriction versus the cost incurred by employers, employees, and 
greater society.  Where the benefits outweigh the costs, ensuring the greatest good, then there is 
an ethical basis for permitting mobility restrictions under utilitarian analysis. 
 
1.  Noncompetes 
  
The costs and benefits of noncompetes to the past employer, employee, and future employer are 
suggested above.  Briefly, the most obvious benefit is that it protects an employer from unfair 
competition in the case where a former employee would otherwise be able to take valuable 
knowledge that belongs to an employer and use it to assist a competing enterprise.  Thus, it is 
also important that noncompetes allow the employer to increase the predictability of access to an 
important resource, in this case a human resource.173  Accordingly, the greater certainty of 
staffing that comes with an enforceable noncompete arguably encourages an employer to invest 
in the employee by investing in valuable human capital.174  Another reason why noncompetes are 
important to employers is that they can be used as a shield if they incorporate antipoaching or 
antiraiding provisions, which not only prohibit a former employee from competing but also stop 
the employee from decimating the former employer’s workforce by hiring away the employer’s 
most valuable employees.175  Nevertheless, such measures potentially constrain employees from 
taking their knowledge, skills, and productive capacity to the workplace where they will be most 
rewarded for utilizing them—whether this is in a competing firm or a personal entrepreneurial 
venture.  In effect, a noncompete may prevent the dispersion of knowledge and its most 
productive use.176          
 The more difficult questions to answer related to noncompetes deal with the costs and 
benefits incurred by society.177  Only legitimate business interests are to be protected and only 
for a limited time and space.  The legal literature has addressed the public policy implications of 
noncompetes in a number of contexts, including their role in human capital investment178 
(particularly dealing with human capital in different industries),179 in fostering or impeding the 
rapid transfer of technology knowledge,180 and in top management contracts.181 Some law and 
                                                 
173 See generally Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 703, 716-18 (1985) (arguing that noncompete agreements are the employer's only means of protecting 
its investment in human capital). 
174 See Bishara, supra note 72, at 305.  
175 See Anenson, supra note 87, at 2 (“In cases of employee poaching and mass defection, employers rely on the 
enforceability of anticompetitive covenants to protect themselves from such unscrupulous practices.”). 
176 See Bishara, supra note 72, at 306-307. 
177 Policymakers acknowledge that noncompetes are normally unenforceable as prima face anticompetitive and 
against public policy. See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 592-93 (N.Y. 1976). 
178 See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 131. 
179 See Bishara, supra note 72, at 318-319. 
180 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 
128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999). 
181 See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do 
Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 254-57 (2006) (examining “the key legal 
characteristics of 375 employment contracts between some of the largest 1500 public corporations and their chief 
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economics literature,182 as well as business economics and management literature,183  has 
engaged in weighing the societal costs versus benefits of noncompetes.  
 This last area of scholarly work has recently seen an increase in empirical studies 
measuring the impact, if any, of noncompete enforcement on employee mobility,184 employee 
compensation and business investment,185 and entrepreneurial activity186 in various business and 
jurisdictional contexts.  The results have been mixed.  On the one hand, scholars have suggested 
that strong enforcement of noncompetes is good for the public interest because it leads to 
increased employer investment in human capital, which benefits society by leading to a better 
trained workforce.187  On the other hand, Alan Hyde has recently interpreted new empirical 
research on noncompetes to suggest that the economic harm to the restriction of labor mobility 
and knowledge transfer outweighs any benefits, concluding that all noncompetes should be 
banned, as in California.188  Moreover, because of asymmetries in the negotiating position 
between powerful employers and individual employees, there may be a tendency for employers 
to overreach in their noncompete terms.189    
 In addition, noncompetes are criticized simply for their anticompetitive nature.190  This is 
perhaps connected to concerns that noncompetes may cause economic harm via inefficient 
allocation of resources since these contracts restrict the free and rapid flow of labor.  In other 
words, the criticism is that noncompetes allow one party to unfairly shift the burden of 
transaction costs related to restrictions to the weaker party, in this case the individual employee 
who is less able to bear the costs of compliance with the contract.  In addition, some 
commentators perceive that “[t]he heightened scrutiny of employee noncompete agreements 
reflects some of the fundamental changes taking place in the economy and in the workplace.”191  
Specifically, noncompetes are problematic in the context of “the changing nature of the 
employment relationship, particularly the movement away from the traditional long-term 
employment relationship typical in the industrial age . . . [and] the benefits of information 
sharing and employee mobility in the information age economy.”192 
                                                                                                                                                             
executive officers” and finding that about two-thirds include noncompete clauses that restrict CEOs post-
employment activities from one to 5 years, with an average duration of 2 years)  
182 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an Incomplete Contracts 
Perspective, (Univ. of Chi. Law and Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 137, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=285805 (addressing the two objectives of ex post (labor mobility) and 
ex ante (human capital investment) efficiency and comparing noncompetes with the alternative contract breach 
remedies of specific performance and liquidated damages). 
183 See, e.g., Marx et al., supra note 81(using a natural experiment created by a change in noncompete enforcement 
law to find lower rates of mobility under a policy of noncompete enforcement).  
184 See Fallick et al., supra note 81; Marx et al., supra note 81. 
185 Garmaise, supra note 33. 
186 Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 81. 
187 Posner & Triantis, supra note 182.  
188 Hyde, supra note 23, at 10-11. 
189 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 141, at 740. 
190 See Bishara, supra note 72.  
191 Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 164. 
192 Id. at 165. 
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 In summary, states that allow employee noncompetes are, in effect, recognizing a public 
policy in favor of tempering free competition and mobility, to varying degrees, by allowing 
parties to contract for certain restrictions.  Even if a noncompete will lessen otherwise lawful 
competition, and potentially inhibit the flow of knowledge, today most states will allow this 
compromise.  However, the employer’s extension of contractual control over a competitive 
human resource comes with potential harm for individual employees who may 
disproportionately bear the costs of protecting an employer’s proprietary information, as well as 
potentially impeding the development of entrepreneurial competitive ventures.  
 
2. Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine  
 
The inevitable disclosure doctrine provides that “employers may enjoin a departing employee 
from taking a job on the grounds that he or she will ‘inevitably disclose’ some unspecified trade 
secret.”193  Accordingly, an employer may restrict a former employee from joining a competitor 
if disclosure of confidential information would be inevitable in that new employment setting.  
Since it is not a contract-based remedy, an employer seeking inevitable disclosure protection 
essentially argues for a default rule to protect her intellectual property as captured in a trade 
secret.  In effect, the employer is asking for a court to determine that a former employee will 
eventually, even unconsciously, divulge or otherwise use the trade secret in competition.  As a 
result, the remedy is a prohibition on the former employee going to work for a competitor where 
it is assumed that the trade secret will surely be used sooner or later. 
The problems with the doctrine from a utilitarian point of view are similar to the issues 
mentioned above with noncompete clauses. In fact, critiquing inevitable disclosure is more 
straightforward than a critique of noncompetes because the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
empowers an employer to restrict the employee’s mobility when the employer did not even 
bargain for the restriction.194  The successful employer receives protection from competition 
indefinitely while the employee’s ability to contribute to society by using knowledge and 
developing skills is limited.195  Thus the employer reaps all the benefits, while the employee and, 
indeed, society bear the costs.  In addition, inevitable disclosure doctrine constrains competition 
and may decrease knowledge diffusion that leads to subsequent innovation.     
Perhaps worse, the implication is that the restriction on mobility is not bounded in time 
and scope like a noncompete term, which is subject to a reasonableness test.  To the contrary, the 
information that is the subject of the trade secret in an inevitable disclosure action will be 
protectable—and thus so too the grounds to prevent the employee from moving freely—as long 
as the information remains a bona fide trade secret.196  This could lead not only to a temporary 
restraining order, causing a break in the employee’s career, but also potentially to a permanent 
restraining order providing that the employee could not go to work for a certain company for a 
                                                 
193 Hyde, supra note 23, at 9. 
194 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 48, at 404 (“[C]ourts that grant injunctions in inevitable disclosure cases are in 
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specified time.197  Moreover, this mechanism is obtained by burdening judicial resources and 
placing extra costs on both parties and on society.  The employee is not paid for this required 
limitation in career opportunities; and, because this is a judicially granted mechanism, the 
employee and the employer, as well as the judicial system, must endure the time and expense of 
litigation.  
It seems as though the inevitable disclosure method is an attempt to put the champagne 
cork back in the bottle, a desperate attempt for the employer to protect assets when it neither 
adequately considered the need for protection ahead of time, nor engaged in adequate dialogue 
with the employee to resolve the issue to everyone’s satisfaction.  Proponents of using inevitable 
disclosure to restrict employee mobility assert that, because it is solely judicially administered, 
there is assurance that the protection will be granted only in legitimate, reasonable, and limited 
cases.198  However, from a public policy standpoint, the contrary argument could be made.  The 
costs and benefits of this mechanism seem stacked in favor of the employer to the detriment of 
the employee’s interests in benefiting from the use of her skills and knowledge, as well as 
society’s interests as a whole in benefitting from an economy based on healthy competition and 
the diffusion of knowledge that can lead to innovation.  If it became the standard mechanism to 
require judicial intervention to resolve termination of employment when trade secrets are at 
issue, it could place an enormous burden on judicial resources, without creating a net benefit for 
society as a whole.199  One would hope this doctrine would be used only very rarely and 
cautiously when there are no other options to protect legitimate proprietary business information.  
It would be preferable for the primary mechanism used to resolve these disputes be one that 
encourages the parties to negotiate a mutually satisfactory resolution within appropriate limits 
that does not unduly burden the greater interests of society.  This might be the strength of the 
garden leave mechanism, discussed next. 
 
3.  Garden Leave 
 
Garden leave is like a noncompete in that it protects an employer’s interest in information by 
prohibiting mobility, but it has the extra advantage of forcing the employer to bear those costs 
post-employment, which compensates the employee.200  From a legal and economic perspective, 
Cynthia Estlund has pointed out that with garden leave an  
 
employer gets the same protection as a similar period of “non-competition,” [as with a 
noncompete] but must bear the primary economic burden itself rather than casting it on 
                                                 
197 Id. 
198 Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 178-85.  
199 See William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal Considerations from the Trade Secret 
Plaintiff's Perspective, 29 REV. LITIG. 729, 809-10 (2010) (“The very point of injunctive relief is to prevent injury 
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200 See Raker, supra note 169, at 752 (finding that “recent decisions suggest that courts are more likely to enforce a 
restriction provision where the company alleviates the effect of the former employee's ‘loss of livelihood’ by paying 
the former employee during the non-compete period”). 
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the employee.  Employees’ postemployment activities are still restricted; some 
opportunities may dry up and some employee knowledge may grow stale during the 
period of enforced idleness.201 
 
However, she also observes that “the garden leave device has the virtue of forcing employers to 
internalize the primary cost of restrictions on employees’ postemployment activities, and thus to 
think twice about whether and how long they are willing to do so.”202  Put another way, the 
obvious cost of paying an employee not to work inserts the discipline of the price mechanism 
into the employer’s decision-making, which provides the employer an incentive to pay to restrict 
the mobility only of highly valuable employees and to do so for the shortest length of time that 
will protect valuable knowledge from being transferred immediately.  
  Even though there are benefits associated with garden leave over noncompetes or 
inevitable disclosure, there are also drawbacks.  The garden leave clause seems less amendable 
to reasonableness scrutiny by policymakers and may still act as an improper restraint on trade.  It 
may also allow employer overreaching, provided that the employer is willing to pay to 
overreach.203  It is still restrictive from a public policy perspective, in that the public is denied the 
beneficial services, innovation, and knowledge of the worker for a period of time.  The worker is 
not being a productive member of society—even if she is not being denied compensation to 
refrain from competition.  Moreover, though the worker is getting paid to lock up her skills, she 
is potentially harmed by not having her skills remain sharp and relevant.204 Shareholders also 
may complain that the firm is paying someone not to work and receiving no tangible value in 
return. There are business issues with that type of waste.  Nonetheless, this cost is arguably a 
good investment because it reduces the otherwise likely transfer of time sensitive knowledge, 
skills, and relationships to a competitor.  Finally, garden leave is fundamentally an 
anticompetitive mechanism that could lead to abuse, albeit perhaps less than the other two.   
 
C.  Fairness Analysis  
 
Rawls’s ethical theory centers on justice and fairness in the design and evaluation of social 
institutions.205  Scholars holding the traditional narrow view of the applicability of Rawls’s 
“basic structure” of society generally reserve Rawlsian analysis for public law issues such as 
basic constitutional liberties and systems of tax and transfer, rather than private law issues such 
as provisions of employment contract law.206  In this view, contracts are seen as a private 
outcome of promises made between specific parties, where there is little role for an analysis of 
overall social fairness.  However, Rawls’s own writings are ambiguous as to which social 
                                                 
201 Estlund, supra note 107, at 425. 
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203 Hepple, supra note 108, at 214-15. 
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institutions are appropriately evaluated in terms of fairness in the basic structure.207  A broader 
view asserts that Rawlsian analysis of justice as fairness can legitimately be applied to systems 
of private law such as the body of laws governing contracts.208  In a Rawlsian analysis, “contract 
law would be constructed such that, when viewed in conjunction with all other legal and political 
institutions, it best serves the demands of the principles of justice.”209  For purposes of this 
discussion, we will take the broader view and use a simplified Rawlsian analysis to explore 
restrictions on employee mobility as part of the social institution of employment law. 
 To consider the fairness of various legal institutions controlling the mobility of 
employees—including contractual noncompete clauses, the inevitable disclosure doctrine, and 
garden leave—we engage in a Rawlsian thought experiment.  Thus we imagine ourselves in the 
“original position” behind a “veil of ignorance,”210 not knowing whether we would be an 
employer seeking to protect business assets from unfair competition, an employee seeking to 
preserve her freedom of movement, or a start-up firm looking to hire experienced staff.  The 
parties would not know what type of business assets would require protection, nor the nature of 
the competitive market.  Moreover, the parties would not know the skill level of the employee, 
the nature of the labor market, nor the relative bargaining power of employer and employee.   
 In this thought experiment, we seek to establish a social order with impartial and rational 
principles, including the liberty principle, which assumes that all persons are free and equal,211 
and the difference principle, which permits social and economic inequalities as long as the least 
advantaged members of society are benefitted.212  The difference principle would not be applied 
on a transaction-by-transaction basis, rather the idea is to establish “a set of rules that, when 
applied generally, is instrumental to the overall scheme of legal and political institutions that 
maximizes the position of the least well-off, as compared to other possible schemes.”213  From 
behind the veil of ignorance, we want to determine reasonable mechanisms for employers to 
protect valuable firm assets, such as strategic knowledge and information from unfair 
competition, which would also protect an employee’s ability to sell her labor services in an open 
market where they would be utilized at their highest value.  From a societal perspective we might 
want to balance the growth and innovation benefits of a high-velocity labor market214 with a 
degree of stability and certainty in outcomes.215 
                                                 
207 Id. at 604-05 (citing THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 21-23 (1989); id. at 604 n.26 (quoting POGGE, supra 
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1.  Noncompetes 
 
As noncompete agreements are contractual clauses that can be negotiated between the parties, 
they could be ideal for protecting the interests of employers while preserving the rights of 
employees.  But as applied, noncompete clauses are often unilateral mechanisms that force 
employees to bear the primary burden and that allocate the benefit to established employers.  
Because the burden of the noncompete is externalized by the employer onto the employee, 
employers have an incentive to overreach.  Thus, in the original position from behind a veil of 
ignorance, the question arises whether the interests of the most vulnerable populations are 
protected by this practice.  Differences in bargaining power lead to employees signing 
noncompete clauses that are detrimental to their interests simply because they have limited 
alternate options.216  This concern is underlined by instances of noncompete agreements being 
enforced against involuntarily terminated or low-skilled employees who have few opportunities 
for alternative employment.217    
 The effort by some state legislatures to narrow the applicability of noncompetes to only 
skilled, high-earning employees is one potential solution, as these individuals are more likely 
than low-earning employees actually to have access to business information worthy of 
protection.218  This solution might be fairer to employees; however, it could potentially increase 
the anticompetitive impact on society precisely because skilled employees are most likely to 
innovate and create start-up enterprises.  Finally, one negative point for employers is the 
uncertainty involved in whether proprietary business information will actually be protected 
because employers are dependent on the courts to enforce noncompetes when employees resist 
them.  Because of these issues, under a Rawlsian analysis, it seems clear that use of noncompete 
clauses to protect competitive business information would not be the fairest mechanism to any of 
the parties, particularly to the most vulnerable. 
  
2.  Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine 
 
In some ways, this doctrine raises even more concerns than noncompetes related to 
fairness because it does not require prior notice to or the consent of the employee.  Nevertheless, 
some commentators find the inevitable disclosure doctrine superior to noncompetes.219  The 
                                                 
216 For a discussion of these issues, see supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text. 
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upside of this doctrine is that it is crafted and enforced by judges who can carefully tailor the 
application of the doctrine to protect specific business information, while allegedly ensuring 
against overreaching, which can have a chilling effect on an employee’s mobility.220  Thus this 
doctrine may be more balanced and equitable, with judges assuring the protection of the interests 
of the most vulnerable. 
 However, there are several downsides of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.  First of all, 
justice for employers is uncertain as they will not know whether their competitive information 
will be protected until the resolution of the process. This mechanism is even more dependent on 
judicial enforcement than noncompetes.   For employees who are precluded from employment 
options as a result of the application of this doctrine, fairness of the outcome may be 
questionable as the remedy is often not  temporary, but rather a permanent injunction.  As the 
new psychological employment contract more frequently asks employees to provide for their 
own futures and bear the risks of economic cycles,221 the burden of limited employment options 
might fall quite heavily on an employee.  Thus, looking at the inevitable disclosure doctrine as a 
social system of employment law, Rawls might find it to fall short in the application of the 
difference principle. The social and economic inequalities inherent in this mechanism do not tend 
to maximize the position of the least-advantaged members of society.  
 
3.  Garden Leave 
 
Given that the foundation of a Rawlsian analysis is to find a solution for the structure of 
society that all parties can agree upon regardless of their position in society, there are many 
reasons why garden leave might be preferable to the others.  There are several benefits of garden 
leave. First, it is neither unilateral nor court determined, but rather a negotiated agreement, where 
the benefits and burdens are shared by the employer and employee.  While the employer receives 
protection of proprietary business information for the agreed amount of time, the employee is 
compensated for the lack of livelihood during that period.  The burden is not externalized by the 
employer (as with noncompetes), but a cost for exercising this mechanism—the cost of the 
continued salary of the employee—is borne directly by the employer rather than some state-
based unemployment insurance.222  Thus, the party that is usually more vulnerable is afforded 
greater protection in this case than in any other type of mobility restriction because the 
employee’s livelihood during the relevant period is ensured as part of the mechanism.  As a 
result, an employer has an incentive to tailor and limit the garden leave to only the amount of 
time that is relevant to the specific position and business knowledge gained by the employee.   
When it comes to social impacts, garden leave, like noncompetes and inevitable 
disclosure, has negative social impacts related to restraints on innovation as a result of limited 
labor mobility and knowledge transfer.  However, with this mechanism it remains possible for 
the employer to protect resources that it values.  Because garden leave involves a negotiated 
solution that shares costs and benefits between the parties, Rawls’s liberty principle supporting 
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the freedom and equality of all parties is upheld.  For these reasons, while there are still 
weaknesses, a Rawlsian analysis of employment mobility mechanisms is likely to favor garden 
leave over other options. 
 
D.  Comparison of Mechanisms 
 
We have identified various strengths and weakness of the three mechanisms for restricting 
employee mobility from the perspectives of rights, utilitarian, and fairness ethical reasoning.  
These perspectives give a fuller consideration of the three elements of the reasonableness test 
applied by courts for the enforcement of noncompete clauses.   
Two questions remain to be discussed in this article.  First, in comparing the analyses of 
the three mechanisms, while each has shortcomings, is there one mechanism that should be 
promoted more than the others from a public policy perspective?  In other words, on the 
individual level, which mechanism should an ethical manager choose to use?   Second, what 
improvements can be suggested in the application of each of these mechanisms to counter the 
problems identified herein?  We will wrap up this section on the ethics critique of restrictions on 
employee mobility by discussing which is the preferable mechanism.  Then, we will address the 
second question in our recommendations in Part IV. 
 In our assessment, garden leave, which seems to be relatively new to the United States, 
generally provides an improvement over the existing structure of judicial enforcement of 
noncompete clauses or the inevitable disclosure doctrine.   The main weaknesses of the garden 
leave doctrine are the required idleness on the employee’s part that likely results in a loss of 
productivity to the detriment of corporate shareholders and society overall, as well as the 
employee’s potential loss of skill sharpness.  Nevertheless, from a rights perspective, garden 
leave seems best to protect the fundamental rights and legitimate interests of both employers and 
employees.  Employers can preserve their property rights to proprietary information. Employees 
preserve their freedom to exercise and develop their productive capacity.  The recognition of 
rights and obligations of both parties is inherent in the garden leave mechanism and may serve to 
promote a basis for mutually agreeable compromise, finding a way to protect the important rights 
of both parties. 
 From a utilitarian perspective, by protecting the employer’s proprietary information only 
to the extent that the employer is willing to pay the employee to remain idle, the price 
mechanism inherent in a garden leave provision provides a way to optimize the cost-benefit 
analysis.  This has the benefit of providing the specific degree of security that the employer 
requires to continue to invest in knowledge development. As a result, the long-run social cost is 
lessened when the employee is more quickly able to deploy to her desired position, though there 
is a temporary decrease in productivity during the leave period. Moreover, garden leave also 
limits the restriction on competition and knowledge diffusion within society to a temporary 
period, as well as reduces the costs of using scarce judicial resources.  From a utilitarian 
perspective, garden leave may provide greater benefits to the employer, the employee, and to 
society as a whole, while limiting the costs borne by each party.  Thus, garden leave provides for 
a greater good relative to the other two types of mobility restrictions. 
 Finally, from a Rawlsian perspective, garden leave is the mechanism most likely to create 
a social order that ensures equality while protecting the interests of the most vulnerable.  The 
burden of protecting the employer’s interest in proprietary information is shared by both parties 
rather than wholly externalized by the employer because the employer pays the employee for the 
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agreed upon period of idleness during which the employee agrees not to use or develop her skills 
on behalf of a competitor.  This structure of private contract law may result in a more just social 
order than either of the other two mechanisms. 
 From a business ethics perspective, while garden leave also has its flaws, it may be most 
preferable for policymakers, employee interest groups, and managers to encourage the use of 
garden leave policies.  While we provide more specific recommendations below relative to 
limiting the weaknesses inherent to each of the three employee mobility restriction mechanisms, 
overall, we assert that legislatures considering regulations on employee mobility restrictions and 
drafters of the Restatement of Employment Law may wish to consider encouraging garden leave 
as the preferable mechanism for protecting the interests of both parties and society as a whole.  
Further, managers seeking to implement ethical business practices may favor garden leave 
policies above other types of mobility restrictions.  
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS 
 
We have reviewed three mechanisms for restraining employee mobility and protecting employer 
proprietary information and scrutinized each using various business ethics frameworks.  First, we 
examined these mechanisms from a property rights-based view, which emphasizes the 
employer’s right to protect its business assets and the employee’s right of control over her labor.  
Second, we applied a utilitarian account of the costs and benefits to employers, employees, and 
society of the three mechanisms.  Finally, we applied a Rawlsian perspective to analyze the 
equity and fairness of each mechanism, with an eye on reducing the negative impact on the most 
vulnerable individuals in the employment relationship.    
Our analysis shows that each mechanism is problematic in its own way.  Accordingly, a 
court or state legislature wishing to advance any of the ideals (achieving fairness, maximizing 
social benefits, or protecting property rights) needs to recognize the shortcomings of each.  In 
this section, we offer recommendations to policy makers to overcome some of the shortcomings 
inherent in each of the employee mobility restraint mechanisms, while still recognizing the 
important of protecting proprietary business information.  In general, we suggest that it would be 
most desirable for all persons concerned (except perhaps litigators who specialize in employment 
termination lawsuits) if the preferred mechanism protecting business proprietary information 
would prioritize open communication, mutual understanding, and negotiation between employers 
and employees rather than unilateral or judicially imposed obligations. 
The noncompete mechanism seems to inadequately protect individuals’ rights,   because 
of the bargaining asymmetries inherent in the inception of the agreement.  Noncompete 
enforcement is also subject to abuse by employers who are generally in a more powerful 
bargaining position.  For instance, the employer can use the mere threat of litigation over a 
noncompete to chill the employee’s desire to move to a competitor or to start a competing 
enterprise.223  Post-employment enforcement also leaves the employee uncompensated by the 
employer and unable to earn a living working in her preferred position.224  Essentially, the 
employer has little cost incentive not to overreach and try to enforce the greatest restriction on 
mobility possible, at the expense of the employee’s property rights.   
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Noncompete policy can be changed to remedy these issues and better achieve ethical 
ideals.  For example, limiting the level of employee who may be subject to noncompetes might 
help address property rights concerns.  In addition, specific rules limiting the types of business 
information that may be covered by a noncompete may better ensure that the benefits employers 
gain by enforcement of noncompetes outweigh the social costs of constrained competition.  
Finally, the process by which noncompetes are established may be reformed to better achieve 
fair and equitable outcomes.  
All states that permit noncompetes should limit their applicability solely to employees 
who are most likely to have possession of proprietary business information that is sufficiently 
valuable to require protection.  For instance, proposals in Massachusetts and Illinois seek to limit 
the type of employees who may be covered by a noncompete to highly-compensated and 
business-crucial employees.225  In addition, for over three decades, Colorado’s noncompete 
statute has limited noncompete enforcement to “[e]xecutive and management personnel[,] and 
officers and employees who constitute professional staff to executive and management 
personnel.”226  For other jurisdictions interested in limiting the coverage of noncompetes to 
employees whose mobility to a competitor may be cause for legitimate concern, this coverage 
could be determined, for example, by setting a limitation based on the employee’s rank, salary, 
or expertise.  Along this line of thinking, the type of business information that is protected by 
noncompetes should be limited to truly proprietary information that is strategically relevant to 
the firm’s competitive competency.   
Finally, the process of entering into a noncompete agreement should be regulated to 
ensure that there is no question that employees fully consent to the noncompete clause. At the 
outset, when the parties are negotiating all the relevant aspects of the job or of a promotion, such 
as salary and duties, the employer should be required to disclose the terms that will be required 
of the employee.  Arnow-Richman suggests courts could accomplish this if they simply refused 
jurisdiction over noncompete agreements that were not signed as part of the primary negotiation 
for the job.227  While noncompetes can be an important mechanism to protect business 
proprietary information, limiting them in these ways would cut down on litigation. 
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is perhaps even more antithetical to an employee-
rights or fairness-based ethical perspective.  Specifically, the doctrine restricts the post-
employment mobility of the employee as does the noncompete, but it does so without clearly 
defined temporal parameters. The theory is that the trade secret in the employee’s possession is 
always at risk of disclosure if the employee works for a competitor. The doctrine can arise in the 
absence of a noncompete or any other contractual agreement. Thus, on its own, an imposition of 
an inevitable disclosure-based injunction prohibits an employee’s mobility, requiring neither the 
employee to consent to the restriction nor the employer to negotiate or pay for it.  As a result, the 
employee cannot work for a competitor—perhaps indefinitely—yet never accepted the restriction 
nor received compensation for it.  The balance clearly shifts to the employer at the expense of the 
employee’s property rights.   
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The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is also antithetical to the idea of maximizing social 
benefit.  In terms of the potential benefits to society, this mechanism does not reward businesses 
that act with foresight to protect business secrets and seek common ground with employees.  
Rather it rewards firms that have no other way to protect valuable trade secrets.  In terms of costs 
to society, the fact that this doctrine is solely judicially enforced means that if it became a 
universal practice, significant judicial resources could be tied up in this mechanism (making 
employment litigators the most satisfied beneficiaries). 
To improve this mechanism in a manner to better achieve ethical ideals, the application 
of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure should be limited. Specifically, courts could ensure 
greater fairness and equity in the judicial process when applying the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine by limiting who could be subject to the doctrine (to better protect property rights) and 
specifying what subject matter it can cover (to maximize benefits while minimizing social costs).  
As with noncompetes, only high-level employees who are proven to have possession of high-
level proprietary business information should be subject to such injunctions.  Further, the 
employer should have to establish that the information actually possessed by the employee is 
sufficiently valuable to require protection.  In other words, it should cover only truly proprietary 
information that is strategically relevant to the firm’s competitive position and core competency.   
            Finally, in terms of process, before a judge can impose an injunction, there should be 
some evidentiary requirement establishing that the employer has already met a very high 
standard for enacting measures to protect its business proprietary information.  Such measures 
could include things such as regularly requiring employees to sign confidentiality agreements;  
seeking and defending legal intellectual property protection for any business information, 
processes, and knowledge that are subject to federal patent, trademark, copyright, and trade 
secret rules; and limiting which employees have access to full knowledge about key proprietary 
business processes, secret recipes, and client lists.  In order to conserve rare judicial resources, 
the burden of proof to obtain an injunction based on the doctrine of inevitable disclosure must be 
sufficiently high to establish that all other mechanisms to protect business information have been 
attempted and this really is the last resort.  
 Of the three mechanisms, garden leave seems to be on better ethical grounds in terms of 
the fairness and equity provided to the departing employee.  With garden leave the employer 
internalizes the cost of enforcing a restriction on employee mobility.  Thus, the price mechanism 
ensures that the potential power-abusing party (the employer) will restrict only behavior that it 
thinks is truly worth purchasing and creates an incentive to limit the period of mobility 
prohibition.  When the employer willingly, if begrudgingly, bears those costs after the employee 
leaves, it becomes clearer that removing the employee from the labor market has tangible costs.  
With garden leave the employer will more likely accurately value the true costs of restricting 
mobility and have an economic incentive to refrain from overreaching or any vindictive 
behavior.  As compared to the bluntness of a noncompete for restricting unfair competition, 
garden leave may actually sharpen the focus on the issues related to competitiveness and specific 
employees’ financial value to a firm. 
Thus, with garden leave there is an ethically sound balance struck between the individual 
rights of the employee to restrict the sale of her labor and the employer’s protectable interest in 
curtailing unfair competition.  The Lockean concern about abuse of the employee’s property 
rights is alleviated because garden leave creates a market for the employee’s services, values 
them accordingly, and compensates the employee.  Like the noncompete negotiation, but now 
with a market valuation component, the employee retains some power to sell her labor (i.e., 
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choose to work for a competitor) but does so on more balanced terms.  Moreover, the incentives 
align for the employer not to overreach, because it is forced to pay for any immobility it 
“purchases” during the garden leave period.  For these reasons, the concerns about which 
employees and what information the garden leave captures and restricts appear to become less 
dire.  Just as with noncompetes the employer should disclose the terms that will be required of 
the employee at the outset, when the parties are negotiating all the relevant aspects of the initial 
employment or subsequent promotion such as salary and duties, in order to ensure there is no 
question that an employee fully consents to a garden leave clause.  In addition, the garden leave 
clause could include a mediation requirement in the event of disagreement about its application, 
which would ensure that open communication, mutual understanding, and negotiation between 
employers and employees would be prioritized over unilateral or judicially imposed obligations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Legislatures and judges have sought to find the socially optimal balance of the tensions between 
the desire for freedom of employee mobility and the need to protect business information that 
creates competitive advantage.  Nationwide, legal decisions run the gamut in terms of regulations 
and rulings permitting or prohibiting employee mobility restraint mechanisms such as   
noncompetes, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, and garden leave.  While these legal opinions 
or legislative developments may refer generally to concepts such as property rights, utilitarian 
analyses, and fairness, we hope that this review of the ethical and philosophical bases for these 
concepts might provide a much-needed context to support –policy development.   
Moreover, this analysis helps to address a gap in the literature on the evaluation of ethical 
issues related to employee mobility restraints.  The discussion above may inform the debate on 
the appropriateness and legitimate scope of these measures.  This analysis may support future 
researchers not only in their work with these specific legal mechanisms but also perhaps more 
broadly in evaluating property rights, balancing costs and benefits, and determining fairness in 
the context of a knowledge-based economy.   
 
